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STUDENT COMMENTS
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW:
SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT AND
THE DEMISE OF THE CONGLOMERATE
MERGER
And it seems to me that at this time we need education in the obvious more than
investigation of the obscure.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
The threat posed by the post-war merger boom to the preservation or
attainment of a vigorously competitive economy, and the inadequacy of
existing antitrust law in dealing with this threat, provided both the occasion
for and the impetus to the 1950 amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton
Act.' What was felt to be needed and what Congress provided was a
broadly worded statute applicable to all types of mergers and designed to
curtail merger activity in a market before it reached the monopoly propor-
tions proscribed by the Sherman Act. As amended, Section 7 provided:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the
assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly. 2
Beyond specifying "line of commerce," Congress prescribed no criteria
for defining the relevant product market in which the competitive impact
of a merger was to be measured. Instead, it left to the courts and the Federal
Trade Commission the task of defining the relevant market in individual
cases and of developing standards of general application for market
definition. It also left to them the difficult problem of devising standards
for determining whether a merger has the effect on competition proscribed
by the statute!'
In the fourteen years since Section 7 was amended, standards for
* Speech to the Harvard Law School Association of New York, February 15, 1913,
in Collected Legal Papers (1920), p. 293.
1
 For the legislative history of the amendments, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962); Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of
Law and Economics, 74 Ham L. Rev. 226, 233-38 (1960) ; Note, 52 Colum. L. Rev,
766 (1952).
2 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended by the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, 64 Stat.
1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. 18 (1958).
8 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 1, at 320-21.
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testing the legality of conventional horizontal and vertical mergers have
been established,' but the fate of so-called conglomerate mergers and, there-
fore, the full meaning of the statute is just beginning to emerge. In the past
year, the FTC and the Supreme Court handed down several significant
conglomerate merger decisions. The object of this comment is to examine
these cases and to discuss the standards they establish.
THE CONGLOMERATE MERGER
The conglomerate merger is usually defined negatively; if a merger
is neither horizontal nor vertical,° it is conglomerate. Since the conglomerate
simply substitutes one firm, which has not sold in the market prior to the
merger, for another, which has, it does not diminish the number of firms
in the market. And, since the conglomerate does not effect any change in
the market share of the acquired company, no immediate increase in con-
centration in the industry results. Accordingly, the simple market share
test is unavailable.° Likewise, the "foreclosure of a substantial share of the
market" test, used in vertical integration cases, 7 is inapplicable to the
conglomerate, which by definition assumes the absence of a supplier-
customer relationship.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION DECISIONS
The Federal Trade Commission has done most of the work in the
development of standards for dealing with conglomerates. Exposed to more
Section 7 cases than the individual district courts, the Commission has had
greater opportunity to develop a unified, coherent approach. Its efforts in
this area culminated in The Procter & Gamble Co. 8 case, probably the most
important treatment yet of the conglomerate merger under Section 7.
An opinion as far ranging as Procter & Gamble is difficult to analyze.
Its chief importance is as a vehicle for establishing sweeping rationales for de-
ciding Section 7 cases, based on the Commission's view of the social and
economic values which Section 7 is designed to promote. Its full import
cannot be grasped by piecemeal attack. A true appreciation of its scope and
impact can be gained only by reading it as a whole, in the light of prior
and subsequent Commission decisions. If this is done, it soon appears that
4 United States v. Phildelphia Nat'l. Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) ; Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, supra note 1.
5 A conventional horizontal merger is one between firms, operating in the same
geographical area, that make or sell the same product, or products which are close
substitutes for each other. A vertical merger, as usually understood, is one between
firms that are actually or potentially in a customer-supplier relationship.
6 This test uses the percentage of the relevant market controlled by the company
resulting from the merger as the basis for inferring that the merger may substantially
lessen competition. See text accompanying note 197, infra, and United States v. Philadel-
phia, Nat'l Bank, supra note 4, at 363-67; Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust
Policy, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 176-182 (1955).
7 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 1, at 323-24, 328; Kessler and
Stern, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 Yale L.J. 1, 64-78 (1959).
8 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (Trade Reg. Rep. Tr. Binder, F.T.C. Complaints, Orders,
Stipulations) Q 16673 (Nov. 26, 1963), appeal docketed, No. 15769, 6th Cir., Feb. 13, 1964.
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the economic theories adopted by the Commission in Procter & Gamble for
appraising the competitive impact of conglomerate mergers overlap and in-
teract in very striking fashion and that, if a unifying thread connects all
these theories, it is that "bigness is bad." Despite Commissioner Elman's
protests that the Commission is not propounding a per se rule, it is hard to
shake the feeling that, under the Commission's standards, no large, success-
ful company may make an acquisition—one with business utility—without
violating Section 7.
PROCTER & GAMBLE
Procter had acquired the assets of Clorox Chemical Company, valued
at $12,600,000 in exchange for Procter stock worth approximately $30,-
300,000.° At the time of the acquisition, Clorox's market share had grown
steadily for almost five years, and its annual sales of just under $40,000,000
represented almost 50% of the nation's household liquid bleach sales.
Clorox and Purex Corporation together accounted for almost 65% of the
total household liquid bleach sales, and, with four other manufacturers, for
almost 80%. Clorox, with thirteen plants throughout the country, was the
only producer selling on a national scale.
In 1957, Procter, the largest advertiser in the nation and one of the
fifty largest manufacturers, had total net sales of $1,156,000,000. Although
not a producer of household bleach before the merger, it manufactured a
wide range of low-priced, high-turnover, household consumer items sold
through grocery, drug and department stores, In 1957, Procter's sales of
packaged detergents represented 54.5% of the national total. In the house-
hold cleansing agents industry, Procter, Colgate-Palmolive, and Lever
Brothers accounted for more than 80% of the total sales. Procter was, and
is, the leading firm of the big three.
The Type of Merger Involved
In his opinion, Elman first disposed of Procter's contention that under
the doctrine of the "law of the case" the Commission could not consider the
evidence which it had previously held insufficient to support a finding.1°
Then, after discussing various categories of mergers, he concluded that "the
merger of Clorox and Procter may most appropriately be described as a
product-extension merger,"" a variant of the conventional horizontal mer-
ger since it involved the "merger of sellers of functionally closely-related
products which are not, however, close substitutes." The expression "func-
tionally closely-related" was said "only to suggest the kind of merger that
may enable significant integration in the production, distribution or market-
ing activities of the merging firms." 12
Packaged detergents . . . and household liquid bleach are used
complementarily, not only in the washing of clothes and fabrics,
9
 The statement of facts is taken from Id. at 21562-65.
10 Id. at 21561.
11 Id. at 21566.
12
 Id. at 21565.
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but also in general household cleaning. . . From the consumer's
viewpoint . .. packaged detergents and liquid bleach are closely
related products. . . . [Furthermore,] . . . household cleansing
agents in general, like household liquid bleach, are low-cost, high-
turnover household consumer goods marketed chiefly through
grocery stores, and presold to the consumer by the manufacturer
through mass advertising and sales promotions. . . .
The functional relationship between household liquid bleach
and products manufactured by Procter appears to hold, even if we
look beyond household cleansing agents to the food, paper and
toilet products which round out the Procter line."
After classifying Procter's acquisition of Clorox as a product extension
variant of the horizontal merger, the Commission might have applied the
conventional market share test." Elman instead abandoned his classifica-
tion of the merger as horizontal, styled it conglomerate, "in the broad sense
of that term," and embarked on what may prove to be a historic analysis
of general principles in Section 7 interpretation.
The Reach of Section 7
"Ali mergers are within the reach of the amended Section 7, whether
they be classified as horizontal, vertical or conglomerate, and all are to be
tested by the same standard." 15 However a merger be classified, its legal
status under Section 7 is the same; if the effect of a merger may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly, in any line
of commerce, in any section of the country, it is illegal."
The Nature of the Test
Mergers are to be judged neither according to a broad rule of reason
nor according to a so-called per se standard. "Congress declared neither
that all mergers, not that mergers of a particular size or type, are per se un-
lawful. In every case the determination of illegality, if made, must rest
upon specific facts."17
 However, "if the adverse effects on competition
specified in Section 7 are proved, it will normally not be open to the re-
spondent to show that redeeming social or economic benefits will flow from
the acquisition."1 8
The Economics of Section 7
Commissioner Elman's pronouncement of the economic first principles
for Section 7 enforcement will doubtless stir up more controversy than any
other part of his opinion. Elman's dissertation on economics rests on the
18 Id. at 21566.
14
 See note 162 infra and accompanying text.
15
 Supra note 8, at 21567. Accord Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 1,
at 317.
10 Supra note 8, at 21567.
17 Id. at 21568.
18
 Ibid. Accord United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, supra note 1, at 371.
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premise that oligopoly is bad, and that the concept of competition which
Congress sought to advance in amending Section 7 is not promoted by an
oligopolistic market.' 3
 He points to congressional fear of rising concentra-
tion in American industry as the motivation for amending Section 7.
In an oligopolistic market, price competition is likely to be tacitly re-
nounced, and perhaps other forms of rivalry as well, because any attempt
by one competitor to increase his market share is bound to bring retaliation.
Since the competition spiral, once begun, will soon cause prices to fall too
low for anyone to make money, no one will willingly start it. 2°
Market concentration is not the only aspect of market structure to be
considered in applying Section 7. According to Elman, condition of entry into
the market by new competitors was the most important other market struc-
ture variable involved in Procter & Gamble?' The presence of potential
competitors waiting to enter the market is presumed to affect the price level
set by the firms in the market: incumbents will not price so high as to en-
courage new rivals; instead they will adopt a lower price level to discourage
them. For this reason, barriers to entry which remove the restraining in-
fluence of potential competition significantly affect conditions in an oligop-
olistic market. 22
In Elman's view, three factors may retard entry. "The first is the
possession of cost advantages by the firms presently occupying the market
vis-à-vis prospective entrants." 23
 There are two types of cost advantages: l)
absolute cost advantages, e.g., control of necessary patents by firms presently
in the market, which puts a new entrant at a marked competitive disadvan-
tage, and 2) advantages of scale. A prospective entrant must plan to operate
on a scale large enough to obtain the same economies or advantages of scale
enjoyed by existing firms if he is to compete with them on equal terms. "If
the scale of optimum efficiency in an industry is substantial, a heavy initial
investment" must be made by the prospective entrant. This is said to force
the challenger to play for high stakes and virtually assures retaliation by
firms already in the market.24
A more important entry-retarding factor is product differentiation, that
is, "consumer preferences as between very similar, close-substitute products
or brands."25
 An industry in which product differentiation is an important
sales factor will prove a difficult one for a new firm to establish a share of
the market in.
"The third entry-retarding factor is the financial size or strength of the
established firms in comparison to that of prospective entrants," because the
prospect of taking on a large, well-established firm would prove a much
19 Supra note 8, at 21568.
2° Id. at 21569.
21 Id. at 21570.
22 Ibid.
23
 Ibid.
24 Id. at 21570-71.
25
 Id. at 21571.
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stronger deterrent to entry than that of taking on a small firm or one in poor
financial condition.26
All three factors interact and their entry-retarding effect is likely to be
greatest in industries in which "the dominant firms have succeeded in differen-
tiating their products through mass advertising and sales promotion. . .
Financial strength and large absolute size may be indispensable attributes in
enabling a substantial market share to be acquired and maintained in in-
dustries characterized by product differentiation through advertising and
promotion."27 Furthermore, the acquisition and retention of a large market
share correspondingly heightens the scale necessary to operate at optimum
efficiency.
Moreover, the same factors which make for high entry barriers also
make for domination of small competitors by firms which have a dominant
position in the market, thereby tending to eliminate actual as well as po-
tential competition. "If the large firm enjoys substantial competitive ad-
vantages by virtue of product differentiation, cost advantage, or financial
strength, any attempt by a small firm to expand its market share at the
expense of the large firm is unlikely to succeed." 28 On the other hand, a
competitive venture by the large firm is apt to first injure these small
firms. "The power to repel or discourage new competitors, then, is the power
to control or discipline existing competitors. . . . "29
The conclusion Elman reaches is that, "in sum, high entry barriers,
like excessive concentration, impair effective competition." 3°
Social Policies Underlying Section 7
According to Elman, the concept of competition upon which Section
7 rests is not purely economic. Congress, in enacting Section 7, clearly in-
dicated that it was concerned with a number of social and political values.
"The interest in fostering equality of opportunity for small business, and in
promoting the diffusion of economic power, although it may not be identical
to the economists' notion of competition, was unquestionably intended by
Congress to be relevant in any scheme for the enforcement of Section 72''31
The Federal Trade Commission, if Procter & Gamble is a reliable indicator,
is not about to subvert this intent.
The Scope of Section 7 Proceedings
Elman's views on. the proper scope of Section 7 proceedings are founded
upon a preventive theory of antitrust law. He attributes to Congress the
postulate that "certain kinds of market structure would ordinarily lead to
non-competitive company behavior." 82 Accordingly, evidence of market
structure rather than of market behavior is the most probative under Sec-
26
 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Id. at 21572.
29
 Ibid.
•80 Ibid.
81 Ibid. Accord Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 1, at 316, 344.
82 Supra note 8, at 21574.
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tion 7. The requirements of a prima facie case are met by "proof that a
merger has created or aggravated a market structure conducive . . . to prac-
tices that substantially lessen competition, or tend to monopoly. . . ."33
The prophylactic function of Section 7 is also an important considera-
tion in defining the standards of relevancy and materiality in Section 7 pro-
ceedings.34
 A statute designed to arrest incipient anticompetitive trends can
deal only with broad probabilities, and, as a result, detailed analysis of all
facts which might possibly be relevant is unnecessary. 35 Not only is such an
investigation unwarranted, but, by prolonging the litigation, it prevents
effective relief; divestiture will seldom reconstitute an acquired firm as a
significant competitive factor if, as will surely happen in time, the assets,
goodwill, and personnel of the two firms have become commingled. Elman
stresses that, under Section 7, effective relief is early relief. "Clear and
relatively simple rules, and the rigorous exclusion of evidence which bears
only remotely upon the central concerns of the statute, are essential if Sec-
tion 7 is not to become a judicial and administrative nuIlity."36
Specifically, post acquisition evidence should be excluded unless the
structure of the market has changed radically since the merger, e.g., when
the market share of the merged firm has dwindled to insignificance or when
adverse effects on competition caused by the merger have clearly occurred."
Because a company will be on its best behavior while Section 7 litigation
is in progress, post acquisition good-conduct evidence is likely to be unre-
liable. Likewise, evidence of non-competitive practices developing after the
merger should not be admitted because a causal relationship between the
merger and these practices will not be clear in most cases." In sum, post
acquisition evidence is of little value in determining what changes in market
structure have resulted from the merger, and its consideration serves only
to hinder efforts to enforce the statute with effective relief.
The Decision in Procter
Applying these general principles, the Commission held that Procter's
acquisition of Clorox substantially lessened competition.
Analyzing the market • structure of the household liquid bleach in-
dustry prior to the merger, the Commission found that it was "manifestly"
highly concentrated and oligopolistic. 35 As the dominant firm and the only
national seller in an industry characterized by product differentiation, Clorox
enjoyed a decisive competitive advantage over its rivals." Also, the industry
was "concentrated, and barricaded to new entry, to a degree inconsistent
with effectively competitive conditions."41
33 Id. at 21573.
34 Accord United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, supra note 4, at 362.
36
 Supra note 8, at 21573.
as Id. at 21574.
87
 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
Bit Id. at 21575.
90 Id. at 21576.
41 Ibid.
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The merger of Procter and Clorox enabled "substantial cost savings
and other advantages in advertising and sales promotion, especially in tele-
vision advertising." 42 As a large multiproduct firm Procter could obtain
volume discounts; more effectively utilize Clorox's advertising expenditures
by buying program sponsorship on television; use joint promotions with
other Procter products, jointly advertise Clorox with other Procter products
in newspapers, and distribute Clorox through its own sales force; obtain
from retailers, as a matter of convenience or expediency, advantages in shelf
display, and acquire increased shelf space by offering the retailer a special
price. There was also the danger that Procter as a multiproduct firm might,
without predatory motive, engage in below cost selling of bleach, for
instance, as a loss leader." Moreover, since "market behavior is determined
by the state of mind of the firms in the market, PrOcter's history of success,
its general size and its prowess, which loom large in the eyes of the small
liquid bleach firms, must for that reason alone be reckoned significant
competitive factors."'4
After this discussion of the way that Procter's acquisition of Clorox
might affect the competitive position of Clorox, Elman proceeded to pinpoint
the consequences of the merger in the light of his general principles.
The merger had "markedly heightened" barriers to entry into the
bleach industry. Procter was in a position to further entrench Clorox's
dominant position by utilizing its advantages in advertising and sales pro-
motion. And, because of the substantial competitive advantages Procter en-
joyed as a giant multiproduct firm, the scale of optimally efficient operation
in the bleach industry was so increased that only very large firms could be
expected to compete on equal terms."
Moreover, as pointed out in his discussion of economic first principles ,48
a heightening of entry barriers is accompanied by a corresponding enhance-
ment of the market leaders' power to dominate small rivals. "Given Proc-
ter's materially greater strength, compared to Clorox,- as a liquid bleach
competitor, vigorous competition by the small firms in the industry would
appear still more effectively and substantially inhibited than prior to the
merger."47
Whether Procter actually used its advantages was immaterial to the
finding that "as a result of this merger, the market structure of the liquid
bleach industry is significantly less conducive to competition than was the
case prior to the merger ... ,"" because the firms in the industry and those
contemplating entry would make decisions in view of what Procter might
do, if provoked, not what it did while its position was unchallenged. Since
the conditions which retard competition in an industry are to an important
extent psychological, "the appropriate standpoint for appraising the impact
42 Ibid.
48 Id. at 21576-78.
44 Id. at 21579.
45 Ibid.
46 Id. at 21572.
47 Id. at 21579.
48
 Ibid.
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of this merger" was that of Clorox's rivals and of potential entrants into the
industry. From this standpoint, the Commission concluded that "the merger
has increased the power of Clorox, by dominating its competitors and dis-
couraging new entry, to foreclose effective competition in the industry."'"
After finding that the merger increased the power of Clorox to foreclose
effective competition in the industry, the Commission addressed itself to
the question whether this impairment of competition was substantial. Looking
to the policy considerations underlying Section 7, it concluded that five fac-
tors enabled it to decide with reasonable probability that the merger had
the "specified statutory effect, namely, of probably lessening competition
substantially, or tending to create a monopoly, in the relevant market." 5°
The first factor was "the relative disparity in size and strength as be-
tween Procter and the largest firms of the bleach industry."
The magnitude of this size disparity was a reliable indicator that the
cost advantages enabled by the merger would be substantial and warranted
the inference that the merger would impart a substantial competitive ad-
vantage to the acquired firm. The inference was considered clearly warranted
in this case because Procter and Clorox were functionally closely related and
the cost savings resulting from the merger "depend principally on nothing
more arcane than the total amount of the pooled expenditures for advertis-
ing. . . ."51
Further, the size disparity in this case was of special significance in
light of Congress's intent to preserve competitive opportunities for small
business because the household bleach industry was essentially a small-firm
industry prior to the merger. Since Procter's great size permitted it to engage
in sales promotion on a much greater scale than previously, existed in the
industry, other firms might also seek to merge with giant firms to gain the
same advantages. "The practiCal tendency of the instant merger, then, is to
transform the liquid bleach industry into an arena of big business competi-
tion only, with the few small firms that have not disappeared through
merger eventually ialling by the wayside, unable to compete with their
giant rivals."52 In Elman's view, it was the prevention of just such a
transformation that was uppermost in Congress's mind in enacting the
amended Section 7." The Commission was not about to disregard this
"manifest Congressional policy."
The second factor that convinced the Commission that the merger
violated Section 7 was "the excessive concentration in the industry at
the time of the merger, and Clorox's dominant position in the industry."
With the substitution of Procter for Clorox, the already formidable
barriers to entry became "virtually insurmountable" and any hope of
eventual deconcentration of the industry, even more remote."
In addition, "since Procter is already a leading manufacturer of a
49 Id. at 21579-80.
50 Id. at 21580.
51 Id. at 21581.
92
 Ibid.
as Id. at 21582.
54 Id. at 21580.
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number of products, its acquisition of Clorox, by strengthening Procter's
aggregate market position, may lead to an impairment of competition in
many industries besides liquid bleach." Also, the , close relationship between
the products of Procter and Clorox enabled the use of Clorox bleach as
a "tying product, loss leader or cross-coupon offering,"" familiar methods of
extending market power, in promoting Procter's products.
The third factor relied on by the Commission was "the elimination,
brought about by the merger, of Procter as a potential competitor of
Clorox."
Procter was an aggressive manufacturer of many products in the
same general line as household bleach and had frequently extended its
product line in the past. By reason of its "proximity, size and probable
line of growth" it was a "substantial competitive factor" in the bleach in-
dustry. The Commission felt it unnecessary to speculate whether Procter
would have entered the bleach industry on its own; the "tangible possi-
bility" of Procter's entrance was an important check on Clorox's misuse of
its market power. The merger, by eliminating this possibility, removed this
significant pro-competitive influence. 56
The fourth factor supporting the Commission's conclusion was "the
position of Procter in other markets."
It was not unlikely that Procter could use its manifest strength in
other markets to enhance Clorox's position in the bleach industry. But if
the record would not support this inference, at least Procter's strength in
other markets rebutted any notion that it would be unable to wield the ad-
vantages it enjoyed over its liquid bleach competitors."
Procter's position in other markets also had an important bearing on
the "psychological response of the members of the liquid bleach industry to
Procter as a competitor."
To the extent that Procter is thought by them to be not only a
large and affluent firm, but also a powerful firm, in terms of mar-
ket power enjoyed in related markets and possibly transferable
into the bleach market, its prowess as a competitor gains an added
and even sinister dimension in the eyes of its liquid bleach rivals
—a factor of considerable importance to the impact of the mer-
ger on competition in the bleach industry... .
Thus, just as ownership of Clorox may enable Procter to en-
hance its competitive edge in other markets, so Procter's position
in other markets may enhance its dominance, through its ac-
quisition of Clorox, of the liquid bleach industry."
Summing up, Elman states, "the short of it is that a conglomerate
merger involving firms which have dominant power in their respective mar-
kets tends to reinforce and augment such power."'"
55 Id. at 21583.
56 Id. at 21584.
57 Ibid.
58 Id. at 21585.
59 Ibid.
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The last factor relied on by the Commission was "the nature of the
`economies' enabled by the merger."
The Commission's short answer to Procter's argument that a merger
productive of such efficiencies as this one should not be proscribed merely
to protect inefficient small firms was that "efficiencies" are pertinent in a
Section 7 proceeding only insofar as they promote competition, and those
in this case served only to impair competition.e°
The "more complete" answer was a scathing attack on the use of heavy
advertising to preserve and further entrench the market power of large com-
panies in oligopolistic industries as "independently offensive to at least the
spirit, if not the letter, of the antitrust laws."" The large scale advertising
"economies" involved in Procter & Gamble were characterized as "price con-
cessions available only to giant firms . . . ," and the intensive advertising of
a "homogeneous product, such as liquid bleach, produced under conditions
of oligopoly," was felt to be of no benefit at all to the consumer. In the
mind of the Commission, "the undue emphasis on advertising which charac-
terizes the liquid bleach industry is itself a symptom of and a contributing
cause to the sickness of competition in the industry. 1)82
Reiterating once more that the Commission's decision in no way rested
on the post-acquisition evidence in the case, 43 Elman ordered Procter to
divest itself of the assets acquired from Clorox, but allowed Procter to spin
off the assets to a new corporation and distribute the stock to Procter's
stockholders, if it wished."
ENTRY BARRIERS, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES AND THE "DEEP POCKET"
Although Elman's opinion utilized nearly every weapon in the Com-
mission's antitrust arsenal to strike down the Procter-Clorox merger, the
theories of barriers to entry and decisive competitive advantages form the
backbone of the decision.
Before examining these theories it will be helpful to consider an earlier
Commission case decided on a decisive competitive advantage theory. In
Reynolds Melds Co.,65 the acquisition of Arrow Brands, Inc. by Reynolds
Metals Company was held to violate Section 7. Reynolds, an integrated
producer of primary aluminum and fabricated aluminum products, including
aluminum foil, with net annual sales of $446,578,767, acquired Arrow, a
firm which bought and decorated aluminum foil for resale to the florist
trade. One of eight firms in the florist foil industry, Arrow, with total sales
of $497,000, had a market share of about 33%. Expressly refusing to base
the decision on the obvious vertical aspect of the case, both the FTC and
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the acquisition violated
Section 7 on the .theory that the financial resources and size of Reynolds
imparted a decisive competitive advantage to Arrow.
Go Ibid.
81 Ibid.
62 Id. at 21586.
Bs Id. at 21586-87.
64 Id. at 21587.
05 56 F.T.C. 743 (1960), enforced, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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The truer picture of anti-competitive effect emerges from even the
most cursory consideration of the post acquisition competitive pos-
tures of the eight previously independent florist foil converters vis-
a-vis one another. Arrow's assimilation into Reynolds' enormous
capital structure and resources gave Arrow an immediate advantage
over its competitors. . . . The power of the "deep pocket" or "rich
parent" . . . opened the possibility and power to sell at prices ap-
proximating cost or below and thus to undercut and ravage the less
affluent competition."
A decisive competitive advantage may arise when a merger results in
a firm that has far greater financial resources than its competitors. This
is the "rich parent" or "deep pocket" theory. Reynolds Metals illustrates
two ways in which the "deep pocket" creates a competitive advantage: by
conferring the ability to maintain lower prices longer than any other firm
in the event of a price war and by making available greater capital for
plant improvements. 67
This so-called "deep pocket" theory appears prominently in the theories
of entry barriers and decisive competitive advantages. As used in Procter
& Gamble, however, the "deep pocket" theory is not limited to the custo-
mary applications appearing in Reynolds; it is extended and transformed
from the simple notion that having more money than competitors is an ad-
vantage into a sophisticated economic concept in Elman's analysis of prod-
uct differentiation, one of the major factors which retard entry.
Basically, Elman's reasoning is as follows. Product differentiation is the
major factor in the sale of consumer goods like household bleach because it
enables a company to establish and maintain a substantial share of the
market. Successful product differentiation is accomplished through adver-
tising. The efficacy and inexpensiveness of advertising is directly propor-
tionate to the volume of a firm's advertising expenditures." The addition of
Procter's financial resources to Clorox enabled it to advertise on a greater
scale and to obtain advertising economies not available to other bleach
producers. The result was a significant advantage over competitors.
This reasoning need not be limited to the bleach industry. It applies to
all industries characterized by product differentiation. Elman's description
of the class of consumer goods to which household bleach belongs 69 and the
importance of product differentiation to successful marketing of these goods 7°
could just as well be applied to any industry which primarily sells to the
consumer through grocery stores, department stores and the like. No detailed
economic data are needed to appreciate the countless industries which this
reasoning encompasses.
Product differentiation combines with two other factors, exhibiting a
more conventional reliance on the "deep pocket" theory, to form the basis of
66 309 F.2d at 229-30.
67 56 F.T.C. at 775.
68 Supra note 8, at 21571.
611 See text accompanying note 13, supra.
70 Supra note 8, at 21563.
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the Commission's theories of entry barriers and decisive competitive ad-
vantages.
The major factors which retard entry are product differentiation, finan-
cial strength or size, and advantages of scale. Product differentiation, we have
seen, is merely a matter of how much money is spent on advertising. Finan-
cial strength operates as a barrier to entry quite simply: the richer the firm,
the less likely that it will be challenged. Advantages of scale, by definition,
are governed by the size of a company. High entry barriers are anticompeti-
tive in that they discourage potential competitors from entering the market
and thereby enable the firms in the industry, to fully exploit the advantages
of their pre-eminent position in an oligopolistic market. In essence, then,
the Commission's analysis of barriers to entry is no more than the expression
of the belief that a good big company will always beat a good little company
in any competitive battle, and that the little company, knowing this, will
refuse to enter the ring.
The same factors which make for high entry barriers—advantages of
scale, product differentiation, and financial strength—Iikewise discourage
actual competition from firms presently in the market. Faced by a big firm
which enjoys a substantial competitive advantage due to its product differen-
tiation, large scale operation, and superior financial strength, the small firms
in an industry will not provoke a crushing retaliation from the dominant
firms by engaging in vigorous competition, especially when attempts to
increase their market shares are doomed to fail. This theory of decisive
competitive advantage—like the theory of entry barriers—is based on the
belief that a big company will always triumph over a little one, and that
the small company knows this. In the Commission's view of the business arena,
David never gathers the courage to meet Goliath, let alone defeat him.
As the above discussion indicates, since the same factors operating in
the same way both heighten entry barriers and impart competitive advan-
tages, the Commission wilt now be able to rely, in a proper case, on this
dual aspect of a merger's anticompetitive effect—injury to both potential
and actual competition. Thus, it can be expected that more cases like Procter
& Gamble will appear in which concern over heightened entry barriers
will alternate with solicitude for the plight of the competitors of the merged
company, and fewer cases will rest on as narrow grounds, or as blunt a
rationale, as the Reynolds Metals decision.
As the above discussion also indicates, naked size and financial power
hold a pre-eminent position in the Commission's theories of barriers to entry
and decisive competitive advantages. Elman fails conspicuously in his
attempts to detract from the heavy emphasis on Procter's size and the
mechanical operation of his theories by indicating situations in which size
disparity might not be significant. After finding that the size disparity
present in Procter & Gamble warranted the inference that substantial cost
savings imparting a decisive competitive advantage would be effected by
the merger, Elman stated: "To be sure, we might hesitate to draw such an
inference in the case of a merger between firms in unrelated industries, or
where the obtaining of cost advantages as a result of the merger depended
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on complex technological factors." 7 ' Common sense dictates that no firm would
attempt a merger of this type unless it felt capable of effectively competing
in the industry. If the acquiring firm feels it has the experience, knowledge,
and ability to handle the technological problems of the industry, and to ob-
tain cost advantages, it is doubtful the Commission will disagree. A company
that entered a new industry without the experience, knowledge, and ability
to compete effectively or to solve the technological problems involved in
obtaining cost advantages need not be attacked under Section 7; with man-
agement possessing the business acumen to negotiate so judicious a venture,
no doubt the company will fail before litigation is instituted.
In the same vein, Commissioner Elman's statement, the acquisition by
Procter of, say, a small automobile manufacturer, even if the acquisition
enabled substantial cost savings, would not be likely to impart a decisive
competitive advantage to the acquired firm, given the scale of its competi-
tors,"72 emphasizes the unrealistic—cases involving mergers of this type
are unlikely to plague the courts; nor is business likely to rejoice at the
knowledge it can legally gather grapes from thorns.
The fact of the matter is that Elman's theories of entry barriers and
decisive competitive advantages operate to prohibit any large, successful
company from entering an industry populated by smaller firms for precisely
those reasons that make the merger a sound one from a business viewpoint.
The striking fact about the Commission's theories of entry barriers
and decisive competitive advantages is that they have a virtually automatic
operation. Product differentiation, advantages of scale, and financial strength
are merely different expressions of bigness in operation. The entrance into
an industry of a larger firm than any now present cannot help but raise
entry barriers. Since it is an economic first principle that barriers to entry
and decisive competitive advantages—like undue .concentration—impair
effective competition,la the only real question is whether the impairment
is substantial within the meaning of Section 7.
HOW LITTLE IS SUBSTANTIAL
By relying on factors other than the size disparity between Procter and
the firms in the bleach industry in determining that, as a result of the
merger, the probable lessening of competition would be. substantial, Elman
appears to discount the role that Procter's size played in the decision of
this case. Closer examination of these other factors, however, merely rein-
forces the belief that Procter's size was the key to this decision, for they
relate to, and are the expression of, the competitive consequences of Proc-
ter's status as a large, successful company.
In deciding that the probable lessening of competition in the Procter &
' Gamble case would be substantial, the Commission stressed the huge size
disparity between Procter and firms in the bleach industry: measured by
its sales, Procter was twenty times larger than the biggest firm in the indus-
try. But this is hardly the minimum size disparity that will result in an im-
71 Id, at 21581.
72 Ibid.
73 Id. at 21572.
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pairment of competition sufficient to support a finding that the merger will
probably substantially lessen competition. Would five times the size
of any firm in the industry be sufficient? Two? Perhaps less? The Commis-
sion also emphasized the already high entry barriers and Clorox's dominant
position in the bleach industry. But are these facts really necessary to the
decision?
Suppose the bleach industry were oligopolistic, populated by a dominant
firm and several major ones. Could a firm with greater resources than any
firm presently in the industry acquire one of the major firms?
The distinction between this situation and Procter & Gamble is that
Clorox, as the dominant firm, had built up a consumer preference for its
product. This successful product differentiation made it difficult to pry
customers away from Clorox, and, since it obtained a premium price for its
bleach, Clorox had a flexibility in pricing which a new company would lack.
In short, Clorox had attained the market power made possible by successful
product differentiation. In the case of a major firm being acquired by one
larger than any in the industry, the immediate anticompetitive effects of the
merger are not so great because the acquired firm has not differentiated its
product as successfully as the dominant firm. However, serious anticompeti-
tive effects can be expected.
The acquiring firm, by using its greater financial resources, can advertise
on a scale greater than had hitherto been known in the industry. Since the
heavier advertising will necessarily increase its market share, the potential
exists for the new firm to displace the dominant one. And this heavier em-
phasis on advertising increases the scale of optimum efficiency in the industry.
As a larger firm the new company may be able to utilize certain advantages
of scale in aid of the acquired company. The financial strength of the new
company makes potential competitors even less anxious to enter the industry.
In sum, barriers to entry are now higher.
Actual competition is also injured in this situation. The size, financial
strength, and ability to differentiate its product possessed by the new firm
will make present competitors less likely to compete vigorously, since any
competitive venture which threatens to increase the small firm's market share
will now provoke forceful retaliation from two sides—the dominant firm
and the major firm, both of which have the resources to crush their smaller
rivals.
Would the impairment of effective competition in this case be substan-
tial? This question really depends on the relative size disparity between the
new firm and those presently in the industry, both in and of itself and as
the keystone of other factors."' The disparity need not be great. As Elman
puts it, ". . . a merger involving a leading firm in a market that is already
well on its way to a non-competitive structure may be unlawful under Sec-
tion 7 even where the aggravation of non-competitive market conditions by
the merger may seem relatively slight because of the already advanced oligop-
oly condition of the market." 75
74 Supra p. 267.
75 Supra note 8, at 21583.
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Suppose the bleach industry were oligopolistic, dominated by a few
major firms of roughly equal size. Could a firm with greater financial re-
sources and larger size than any of the firms in the market acquire one of
these major firms?
Once again the size and wealth of the entering firm compared with
that of the firms in the market triggers the automatic operation of the
Commission's economic principles. The new firm's size, its advantages of
scale, its "deep pocket," and its ability to differentiate its product give it the
power to effectively repel potential competitors and to discipline present
ones. Presumably, potential competitors are now even less anxious to enter
the market. More important, if the new firm fully exploits its competitive
advantages the probability is that it will leap to a decisive competitive advan-
tage over the other major firms in the industry. As a result, the unhealthy
competitive structure of an oligopolistic industry takes a turn for the worse,
and the spectre of monopoly appears.
In view of the heavy emphasis that Section 7 is designed to prevent
further concentration in the economy, and in light of the fact that monopoly,
or single firm dominance, is considered an even greater evil than oligopoly,
the size disparity, in this case also, need not be great to result in a finding
that the 'merger substantially lessens competition.
Perhaps a larger firm with greater resources than any firm presently
in the market can acquire one of the smaller firms in an oligopolistic in-
dustry? This is also unlikely. First of all, credit for some intelligence must
be granted to American business. No firm enters an oligopolistic industry by
acquiring a company hamstrung by an irremediable absolute cost disad-
vantage. As a practical matter, then, the advent of a firm larger than any
now present in the industry, by acquisition of a small one, will occur only
in circumstances that assure the acquiring firm an opportunity to effectively
compete against the major ones, The adverse effects on entry barriers and
the anticompetitive consequences that flow from them can be expected in
this instance also, although at a more remote point in time.
There is another anticompetitive consequence to this merger. Since a
competitive foray by a major company into an oligopolistic industry presuma-
bly first injures the small companies that do not have the financial resources
necessary to compete, is it not probable that the acquisition may be pro-
scribed on the following theory?
The acquisition, by thrusting a new power into the industry, is likely
to result in a battle of the leaders in which the first casualties will be the
small firms. The loss of the small competitors not only results in increased
concentration but also seriously impedes any chance of deconcentration ever
taking place. " [I] f concentration is already great, the importance of prevent-
ing even slight increases in concentration and so preserving the possibility
of eventual deconcentration is correspondingly great." 76
Suppose the bleach industry were deconcentrated, populated by medium
size firms competing on an equal footing, and marked by low entry barriers.
Could a firm such as Procter acquire one of these firms? Clearly not. Once
7 6 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 365 n.42 (1963).
269
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
more, given the direct relation between financial strength and size and entry
barriers, the barriers to entry will be heightened if such a merger takes place.
The acquired firm's greater resources will impart a competitive advantage.
The pernicious quality of this merger lies in its tendency, by initiating a
series of mergers designed to enable the small firms to compete more effec-
tively with the new giant, to convert a small business market into a concen-
trated one populated by a few large corporations. Both Congress and the
Supreme Court have indicated that mergers of this type are to be scrutinized
carefully, so that trends of concentration may be curtailed in their incipiency.
Here again the lessening of competition need not be great in order to be
"substantial" within the meaning of Section 7.
As we have attempted to show in the above examples, in many situa-
tions the slightest lessening of competition may be substantial within the
meaning of Section 7. Although Elman did not have to rely on some of these
principles because of the facts presented in Procter & Gamble, there is
every reason to believe that the Commission will use them in a proper case.
Procter & Gamble AS PRECEDENT
Since Elman wrote the opinion in Procter & Gamble with the avowed
purpose of establishing broad guidelines for deciding Section 7 cases, we have
attempted to give some indication of the potential ramifications of the deci-
sion, rather than try to limit and distinguish the case by its particular facts.
In this respect it is important to keep in mind that many of Elman's ideas
indicate that the size of companies involved in a merger will be an important
consideration in cases invoIVing industries not characterized by product
differentiation.
For instance, the fact that Procter's strength and success in other mar-
kets had created a corporate image which struck fear in the hearts of com-
petitors, was itself a reason Procter's success, general size and prowess must
be reckoned significant competitive factors. 77
 Procter need not in fact have
been a well-managed, aggressive competitor; by so impressing the firms in the
bleach industry it created a psychological climate inimical to competition."
Certaintly this reasoning is applicable to industries other than the bleach
industry. The situation posed by Elman would be present whenever a large,
successful company moves into a different field populated by smaller com-
panies, and the only defense against this position is to deny it.
The statement, "since Procter is already a leading manufacturer of a
number of products, its acquisition of Clorox, by strengthening Procter's
aggregate market position, may lead to an impairment of competition in
many industries besides liquid bleach,'" also embodies a concept of uni-
versal application. Any large firm looking for an opportunity to diversify
would necessarily have been successful in its own field; the transference
of market power which Elman refers to would be present, to some extent, in
any conglomerate where the acquired company is in sound business condition.
77 Supra note 8, at 21579.
78 Id. at 21585.
79 Id. at 21583.
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Finally, the mere fact that Procter was in a related field in and of itself
made it a potential competitor of Clorox. And there need be neither imme-
diate nor projected plans to enter an industry. It is sufficient that the
particular industry be one into which a firm is likely to expand because its
experience and knowledge would be of use in competing therein 80 Under
this view any large, successful company is automatically a potential competi-
tor in every field which is a logical extension of its product line in any
diversification.
As we noted at the beginning of our discussion, Procter & Gamble
must be read in the light of other Commission decisions involving conglom-
erate mergers in order to gain a full appreciation of its significance. Stand-
ing alone, this case could be explained away on its facts, some statements
could be disregarded as dicta, or merely loose language, and through numerous
devices of this sort one could convince himself that the decision is not really
as sweeping as it seems. But the Commission's action in other cases belies
any notion that the emphasis on bigness present in the Procter & Gamble
case is unique, and confirms that the principles, concepts, and theories pro-
mulgated in the case are meant to apply generally in Section 7 cases.
OTHER COMMISSION DECISIONS
Reynolds Metals was bottomed on nothing more esoteric than that
Reynolds had too big a bankroll."
Foremost Dairies, Inc., 82 an early case involving conglomerate mergers,
contains the rough framework of some of the ideas which emerged full blown
in Procter & Gamble. The Commission ruled that Foremost, a diversified
giant, violated Section 7 by acquiring Philadelphia Dairy Products, Inc. on
the ground that the merger foreclosed potential competition between the two.
Although at one time small independent firms could easily enter the dairy
business, recent technological changes and the growth of giant diversified
companies had created substantial barriers to entry into the industry, and, as
a result, the chief source of new competitors in local milk markets was terri-
torial expansion by firms already established in other markets." The growth
patterns of the two companies indicated they were likely to clash as competi-
tors in the Philadelphia area." The likelihood of such a clash was deemed
an important factor affecting competition: "When market concentration is
high, the main, and sometimes the only, restraint on the use of market power
by oligopolistic sellers is potential competition." 85
Throughout its opinion the Commission emphasized the trend toward
concentration in the dairy industry, and that the transformation of decon-
centrated industries into oligopolistic ones was what Congress intended Sec-
tion 7 to prevent. It also pointed to the danger to competition posed by the
80 Supra note 8, at 21584.
81 See text accompanying note 66 supra.
82 Foremost Dairies, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. Tr. Binder, 1961-1963 F.T.C. Complaints,
Orders, Stipulations r 15877 (April 30, 1962), appeal pending 5th Cir.
83 Id. at 20689.
84 Id. at 20688.
85 Id. at 20689.
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competitive advantage which a large diversified firm enjoys over its small
rivals."
In discussing the nature of the test to be applied to conglomerates, the
Commission concluded that "under Section 7, the necessary proof of viola-
tion of the statute consists of types of evidence showing that the acquiring
firm possesses significant power in some markets or that its over-all organiza-
tion gives it a decisive advantage in efficiency over its smaller rivals." 87
In Ekco Products Co.," decided after Procter & Gamble, Ekco Products
acquired all the assets of the McClintock Company, which had a virtual
monopoly of the commercial meat-handling equipment industry. Ekco, a
producer of pans, houseware, kitchenware and the like, was in a closely
related field. The decision rested squarely on a "deep pocket" or "rich
parent" theory. The addition of the Ekco bankroll to McClintock could
not help but entrench McClintock's monopoly position. A concrete illustra-
tion was that subsequent to the acquisition the Ekco-McClintock firm
purchased all the assets of a significant competitor, thereby eliminating it.
The evidence showed this could not have been done by McClintock prior to
the merger because of its strained financial resources. 8 °
Commissioner Elman postulated that the facts of the case called for a
presumption of illegality. "Where a single firm monopolist . . . is acquired
by a corporation having many times the resources of the acquired firm .
that fact in itself makes the merger highly suspect under Section 7. We need
not dwell on the many ways in which the substitution of a large firm such
as respondent for a very small firm such as McClintock would have a ten-
dency to entrench the monopoly position of the acquired firm and, in particu-
lar, to strengthen the Tatter's ability to repulse new competition. See Procter
& Gamble Co " (Emphasis supplied.)"
The Ekco-McClintock merger also removed the restraining influence
of Ekco's potential competition, since Ekco, as a large diversified manufac-
turer of a related product line, was a "prime prospect" to challenge Mc-
Clintock's dominant position in the commercial meat-handling equipment
industry.°/
This case is an excellent indication that the principles and theories
promulgated in Procter & Gamble are meant to apply in cases involving
industries not characterized by product differentiation.
Note the reliance on Procter & Gamble as authority for the central
proposition in the case.
Also, Elman criticized the reliance on post-acquisition evidence by
complaint counsel in this case and reiterated the views of its usefulness which
he expressed in Procter & Gamble." In fact, he did not bother to rely on
86 Id. at 20686.
87 Id. at 20687.
88 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (Trade Reg. Rep. Tr. Binder, F.T.C. Complaints, Orders,
Stipulations) 11 16879 (April 21, 1964), final order 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (Trade Reg. Rep.
Tr. Binder, F.T.C. Complaints, Orders, Stipulations) r 16956 (June 30, 1964).
89 3 Trade Reg. Rep. g 16879, at 21908 (April 21, 1964).
90 Id. at 21907.
Dl Ibid.
02 Id. at 21902.
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the evidence of the Ekco-McClintock firm's acquisition of a substantial
competitor for his decision, 03 even though, since there was a clear causal
relationship between the merger and the impairment of competition brought
about by the demise of this competitor, such evidence came within an excep-
tion to his exclusionary rule."
Consolidated Foods Corp." did not involve product differentiation
and used a theory to condemn the merger which did not appear in the sub-
sequent Procter & Gamble decision. But Elman's opinion in this case, as in
Procter & Gamble, demonstrates his belief that the large conglomerate
corporation poses dangers to competition. And, once again, the greater size
of the acquiring corporation, compared with that of companies in the
industry, was at the core of the theory used to strike down the merger.
Consolidated, a large diversified processor and seller of food products,
acquired the assets of Gentry, Inc., a company primarily engaged in the
production of dehydrated onions and garlic. In 1951, the year of the acquisi-
tion, Consolidated had net sales of $174,006,801 and assets of approximately
$60,000,000. At the time of the acquisition, Gentry had assets valued at
$1,600,000, and, as one of the two dominant firms in a four-firm industry,
it accounted for 28% of the onion and 51% of the garlic sales." In Elman's
words,
the gravamen of this proceeding was that the merger was illegal
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act because it created the serious
danger that Gentry would acquire a protected market, in which
fair competitive opportunities would be denied to other sellers of
dehydrated onion and garlic, as a result of the trade practice known
as "reciprocity."97
Reciprocal buying was described as "nothing more than the simple idea
that will buy from you if you will buy from me,' or the unspoken 'If I
buy from him, he will buy from me.' "" It was said to be anticompetitive
because it injects a foreign element into business relationships: price, quality,
and service may be offset by the attempt or inclination to curry favor, or to
protect one's relations with the other party."
The way in which a conglomerate merger enhances the likelihood that
reciprocity may be practiced was felt to be clear. Diversification increases
the number of opportunities for reciprocal buying because a firm that makes
a number of products is more likely to find a supplier that is also a potential
buyer of one of its products than a small single-line company. Of course,
if the firm is a large purchaser, its purchases are likely to be of such economic
93 3 Trade Reg. Rep. Q 16956, at 22019 (June 30, 1964).
84 Supra note 89, at 21903.
95 Trade Reg. Rep. Tr. Binder, 1961-1963 F.T.C. Complaints, Orders, Stipulations
V 16182 (Nov. 15, 1962), order set aside, 329 F,2d 623 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. granted,
33 U.S.L. Week 3066 (U.S. August 21, 1964) (No. 422).
98 Id. at 20974.
97
 Ibid.
98 Id, at 20975.
99 Id, at 20977.
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importance to its supplier that it will have little difficulty persuading the
supplier to buy from it.
To the extent that a diversification, or conglomerate, merger pro-
duces an industry structure that facilitates and furthers reciprocal
buying, it is likely to lead to the most serious of anticompetitive
consequences, viz., to confer upon large, diversified corporations a
crushing weapon against small, single-Iine competitors.'"
Other established onion and garlic producers, lacking Consolidated's
size and diversification, could not respond to Consolidated's use of reciprocity
in kind, and "it is in the context of just such an industry structure that a
reciprocal buying policy has the greatest chance of success and therefore
poses the most serious threat to competition."'" According to the Com-
mission,
since Consolidated acquired the power to extort or simply attract
reciprocal purchases from suppliers when it acquired Gentry, the
causal relationship between the merger and the injury to competi-
tion implicit in reciprocal buying is patent."
In determining the substantiality of the anticompetitive potential of
the Consolidated-Gentry firm, the Commission analogized reciprocal buying
to tying agreements in its anticompetitive effect. The acquisition of Gentry
provided Consolidated with "a basis on which to 'tie' sales to its supplier
to purchases from them."'" Since Consolidated's acquisition of Gentry
placed it in a position to influence firms that both supplied Consolidated and
bought in volume from Gentry, and the purchases' of these firms amounted
to more than 25% of the onion produced by the industry and almost 25%
of the garlic, the area of prospective market foreclosure was "not merely
significant, but exceptionally large."'"
Other considerations buttressed the Commission's conclusions. Con-
solidated had actually used reciprocity in pushing Gentry's products even
though only sporadically and with limited success; 105
 the industry was so
highly concentrated that it was desirable to remove such obstacles to the
creation of genuinely competitive conditions as respondent's reciprocal
buying power;'" and the preservation of competitive vigor in the industry
required that the acquisition be struck down because it created the oppor-
tunity for Gentry to acquire a protected market share immune from competi-
tion as to price, quality and service, thereby posing a barrier to new compe-
tition."7 In summation the Commission said:
the acquisition . . . has conferred upon [Consolidated} . . . the
power to foreclose competition from a substantial share of the mar-
100 Id. at 20978.
10 1
 Ibid.
102 Ibid .
1" Id. at 20979.
104 Id. at 20980.
1°5 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
107 Id. at 20981.
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kets for dehydrated onion and garlic, thereby jeopardizing the
competitive opportunities of its small, relatively undiversified com-
petitors and tending to lend further rigidity to an already heavily
concentrated industry and to discourage the entry of new competi-
tors, all "without producing any countervailing competitive, econo-
mic, or social advantages." 1"
Since a cease and desist order "could not remove the attraction, implicit
in the Consolidated-Gentry relationship . . for suppliers or prospective
suppliers of Consolidated to purchase from Gentry solely or principally in
the hope of maintaining or enhancing their sales position with Consolidated,"
divestiture was the only remedy which could alleviate the worsening of the
market structure of the industry caused by the acquisition.'"
One cannot read the Consolidated opinion without being impressed
by the scope of the concepts used by the Commission to invalidate the
acquisition. It virtually sets up a presumption of illegality where an acquisi-
tion by a large diversified firm creates the possibility of utilizing reciprocal
buying to influence a substantial share of the market. There need be no
showing that this power was actually used; the mere fact that the possibility
exists, or, in other words, that the market structure is conducive to reciprocal
buying, is sufficient to invalidate the acquisition. While it has been argued
that reciprocal buying is not necessarily anticompetitive or a bad practice, 11°
this position does not carry much weight with the Commission."' The attrac-
tion implicit in the relationship between the acquired and acquiring com-
panies is said to be the crux of the anticompetitive effects flowing from the
acquisition.
Procter & Gamble, and the decisions discussed above, give a good pic-
ture of the Commission's approach to Section 7 enforcement. It has unequiv-
ocally taken the position that market structure, as opposed to market
behavior, is to be examined in merger cases, and the effects of a merger must
be gauged in terms of broad probabilities, with a view to its overall implica-
tion. The Commission has exhibited a keen awareness of the dangers to
competition posed by large, conglomerate corporations, and a wholehearted
acceptance of the social and political values underlying the statute. Although
no per se rule, as such, has been adopted, and the Commission attempts
to evaluate each merger in the light of the particular characteristics of the
industry and companies involved in the case, the economic theories it has
embraced and the standards it applies in testing the legality of conglomerate
mergers leave little room, if any, for sound business acquisitions by large
corporations.
108 Id. at 20981-82, quoting court of appeals opinion in Reynolds Metals Co.,
supra note 65, at 230. For this holding Elman also quoted, in a footnote, the language in
Reynolds reproduced in text accompanying note 66 supra.
100 Supra note 95, at 20982.
110 Handler, Emerging Antitrust Issues: Reciprocity, Diversification and Joint
Ventures, 49 U. Va. L. Rev. 433,433-40 (1963).
111 "[Ht is difficult to see how the quasi-tying-agreement effect of reciprocal buy-
ing fostered by the union of Consolidated and Gentry can be anything but anti-
competitive." Supra note 95, at 20981.
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SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Until last spring, the decisions of the Federal Trade Commission repre-
sented the dark side of the picture for business, because the other enforce-
ment agency, the Justice Department, was consistently losing Section 7 cases
in the district courts 112 And although the Supreme Court held that the stat-
ute had been violated in the first two cases to reach it, it disclaimed any
per se .rule. In fact, the Court emphasized that the decision of a Section 7
case requires an understanding of the state of competition in the particular
industry involved. Even the use of presumption of illegality by the Court
in the Philadelphia Bank case was palatable, given the facts of the case.
Then the axe fell. In four decisions, the Court elaborated its views on Sec-
tion 7, and served notice that the statute severely limits the permissible
merger activities of large corporations.
POTENTIAL COMPETITION
In United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,' the Court held that a
merger which eliminated potential competition violated Section 7. The case
involved the acquisition by El Paso, which, as the only actual out-of-state
supplier, sold 50% of all gas consumed in California, of Pacific Northwest
Pipeline Corporation, characterized by the Court as "the only other important
interstate pipeline west of the Rocky Mountains!' Attempts by Pacific
Northwest to break into the California market, the section of the country
for purposes of the case, were credited by the Court with having a beneficial
effect on competition; indeed an agreement between the two companies prior
to the merger was described as "a 'treaty' . . . that protected El Paso's
California markets."'14
The Court applied the following test:
The effect on competition in a particular market through acquisition
of another company is determined by the nature or extent of that
market and by the nearness of the absorbed company to it, that
company's eagerness to enter that market, its resourcefulness, and
so on.115
Under this test, the fact that Pacific Northwest had never sold in California
and had failed in its attempts, while that "might be weighty if a market
presently saturated showed signs of petering out . . . [was] . . . irrelevant
in a market . . . where incremental needs are booming."'" Pacific Northwest
had "proximity to the California market" and "adequate reserves and
managerial skill." 117
112 E.g., United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) ;
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963); United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 214 F. Supp. 501 (N.D.N.Y. 1963); United States v. El
Paso Natural Gas Co., 1962 Trade Cases 20571 (D. Utah).
113
 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
114 Id. at 658-59.
115 Id. at 660.
116 Ibid.
117 Id. at 661.
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"Unsuccessful bidders are no less competitors than the successful one.
The presence of two or more suppliers gives buyers a choice."" 8 This state-
ment combined with the Court's belief that "one purpose of Section 7 was
`to arrest the trend toward concentration, the tendency to monopoly, before
the consumer's alternatives disappeared through merger . . . ' 111$ indicates
that elimination of potential competition will be an important area of inquiry
in Section 7 cases. This is borne out by the Court's subsequent decision in
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co.'"
In 1960, Pennsalt Chemicals Corporation and Olin Mathieson Corpora-
tion jointly formed Penn-Olin Chemical Company to construct a plant and
to produce and sell sodium chlorate in the southeastern part of the United
States.
Prior to 1961, Pennsalt and two other companies were the only
domestic producers of sodium chlorate. 121
 Pennsalt, with assets of some
$100,000,000 and sales of about the same amount, was engaged solely in
the production of chemicals and chemical products. From its one sodium
chlorate plant, located in Portland; Oregon, it accounted for 57.8% of all
sodium chlorate sales west of the Rocky Mountains. However, because of
the distance from its plant to the southeastern market, Pennsalt was unable
to compete effectively in this area, and its share of the market was only 8.9%.
As a result, the rapidly growing southeastern market had long been dominated
by Pennsalt's two competitors, which between them accounted for better
than 90% of sodium chlorate sales in the area.
In 1960, Olin, a large diversified corporation, had sales of some
$690,000,000 and assets of $860,000,000. Although not a manufacturer of
sodium chlorate, Olin had developed and made available under royalty-
free licenses a patented process for its use in the paper and pulp industry,
and possessed extensive experience in the technical aspects of bleaching pulp,
the main use for sodium chlorate. As a result, Olin had excellent contacts
with the pulp and paper mills, the major purchasers of sodium chlorate.
The trial court found that both Pennsalt and Olin, prior to the joint
venture, had long been interested in the possibility of entering the market
independently; both had the resources and capability to compete effectively
in the market; both could have done so at a profit; and neither had finally
rejected the possibility of individual entry at the time the joint venture
was formed.' 22
 However, the district court held that only in the event that
both companies would have entered the market individually, absent Penn-
Olin, would the joint venture have foreclosed potential competition between
them. And the court found it "impossible to conclude that as a matter of
reasonable probability bath Pennsalt and Olin would have built plants in
the Southeast if Penn-Olin had not been created." (Emphasis in original.)
The court did not determine whether one company would have built
118 Ibid.
11' Id. at 659, quoting United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 367
(1963).
120 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
121 The statement of facts is taken from Id. at 162-67.
122 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110, 128-29 (D. Del. 1963).
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"while the other continued to ponder." But assuming this, whether Penn-Olin
substantially lessened competition would depend on a comparison of the
competitive impact which Penn-Olin will have with that which might have
resulted if either Pennsalt or Olin had entered the market individually.'"
This impact could not be determined from the record in the case, and "solely
as a matter of theory . . . no reason exists to suppose that Penn-Olin will
be a less effective competitor than Pennsalt or Olin would have been." 124
Accordingly, the district court dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Section 7 is applicable to joint
ventures125
 and, reaching the merits, that the district court erred in not
considering the "fact that Penn-Olin eliminated the potential competition
of the corporation that might have remained at the edge of the market, con-
tinually threatening to enter." 126
The Court clearly indicated that potential competition is an important
factor in Section 7 cases:
The existence of an aggressive, well equipped and well financed
corporation engaged in the same or related lines of commerce waiting
anxiously to enter an oligopolistic market would be a substantial
incentive to competition which cannot be underestimated. 127
The evidence in the case so impressed the Court that it stated "unless we
are going to require subjective evidence, this array of probability certainly
reaches the prima facie stage." However, stating "we prefer that the trial
court pass upon this question ... ," the Court remanded the case for a finding
"as to the reasonable probability that either one of the corporations would
have entered the market by building a plant, while the other would have
remained a significant potential competitor."'"
In light of the Court's statement that, "overall, the same considerations
apply to joint ventures as to mergers, for in each instance we are but ex-
pounding a national policy enunciated by the Congress to preserve and
promote a free competitive economy," 1 " the decision in Penn-Olin should
be perused by anyone interested in the fate of conglomerate mergers under
Section 7. The criteria suggested by the Court for assessing the probability
of a substantial lessening of competitionim indicate that joint ventures will
be scrutinized closely in regard to the actual and potential competitive rela-
tionship of the parties involved, their ability to go it alone in the venture,
and the effect of joint entry on both competition and competitors in the
market. These criteria also indicate that the power of the new entry in rela-
tion to the power of the companies already present in the market will be
an important consideration in conglomerate merger cases.
123 Id. at 130.
124 Id. at 131.
125 378 U.S. at 167-72 (1964).
120 Id. at 173.
127 Id. at 174.
128 Id. at 175-76.
129 Id. at 170.
15° Id. at 177.
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Penn-Olin establishes the Court's high regard for potential competition
as a deterrent to the abuse of market power by firms in oligopolistic industries.
But even more important is the Court's emphasis on the fact that
Section 7 speaks in terms of probability, not certainty. The Court reiterates
this point time and again, in marked contrast to the trial court opinion,
which emphasized that Section 7 spoke in terms of probability, not possi-
bility.
The Court's patent concern over potential competition and its heavy
emphasis on the fact that Section 7 speaks in terms of probability seemingly
stems from its view of competitive realities in the highly diversified American
economy. Realizing full well that a large conglomerate corporation's impact
on competition cannot be assessed adequately by examining only a com-
partmentalized segment of industry, the Court intends to discard artificial
concepts when dealing with corporations whose diversified character is such
that they are not bound by classic industry lines, and judge the effect of
a merger in a broad framework, with a view to its full ramifications. Nowhere
is this attitude better illustrated than in the Court's decision in United States
v. Continental Can Co.'8'
LINE OF COMMERCE
Unlike the cases discussed so far, which dealt with whether a merger was
likely substantially to lessen competition, Continental Can turned on the
determination of the "line of commerce," or relevant market, issue. The
concept of the relevant market plays a critical role in Section 7 enforcement.
Definition of the market area affected by a merger is a prerequisite to a
final evaluation of the competitive impact of a merger.1s2 Upon definition
of the relevant market depend the classification of a merger as horizontal,
vertical, or conglomerate and the applicable test for determining whether
there has been a probable lessening of competition. Before its decision in
Continental Can, the Supreme Court's approach to market definition, and,
to a great extent, the fate of mergers involving large diversified firms seeking
further diversification, was largely a matter of conjecture. In deciding
Continental Can, the Court, by unequivocally adopting a "competitive
realities" approach to market definition, went a long way in dispelling the
uncertainty and sealing the fate of such mergers.
Before treating the Continental Can decision it will be helpful to
consider some background on the market concept and the landmark Supreme
Court Section 7 decision, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.'"
The concept of the "market" is an economic one, used to locate and
identify the competitive factors which restrain the economic behavior of
a firm. Many Section 7 cases in which delineation of the relevant market has
been an important, or the controlling, issue, have treated the problem of
market definition as a matter of applying the highly theoretical and technical
181 United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
132 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962) ; United States v.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957).
133 Supra note 132.
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economic concept of "cross-elasticity of demand."'" As described by Pro-
fessor Stocking,
Cross-elasticity reflects the extent to which price changes in one
product affect the amount of another product that buyers will buy.
Where the cross-elasticity of demand for rival products is great, a
decline in the price of one decreases the sale of the other and may
lead to a decline in its price. The production of numerous similar
products with a high cross-elasticity of demand may perform about
the same economic function as does the existence of numerous sellers
of the same product.'"
In economics the concept of cross-elasticity is used to gauge product
substitutability. If products are functionally interchangeable and buyers
respond to a price change in one by an increase or decrease in their pur-
chases of the other, the products may be said to occupy the same market.
For example, if housewives believe that household aluminum foil and waxed
paper are about equally fit for the purpose of wrapping food and they react
to a price increase in aluminum foil by buying more waxed paper, aluminum
foil and waxed paper occupy the same product market. Any attempt to
analyze the competitive effect of a merger must take into account the extent
to which consumers will go in substituting one product for another. If the
merging firms produce the same or close substitute products, the analysis
often need go no further than a comparison of the strength and power of
the merging firms in the product market and an assessment of the new
firm's position. If the analysis discloses that the merger results in a highly
concentrated product market or aggravates an already highly concentrated
market, that alone is enough for holding a Section 7 violation.
The problem is that market definition in terms of product substitution
frequently affords a narrow, one-dimensional view of the market area affected
by a merger. This would suffice if the American economy consisted chiefly
of firms that made and sold a single product line. But market definition
solely in terms of product substitution can scarcely provide an adequate
context for determining the competitive impact of a merger between two
highly diversified, multiproduct firms.
According to economist Irving Lipkovitz, a better approach to market
definition would be to look at the "market" and "competition" through
the eyes of the businessman, looking to all the factors. As the businessman
sees it,
. . . the relevant market is the area of competition, and that will
change from company to company, not just from industry to in-
dustry, and also from time to time, depending upon the battle
of materials, depending upon international competition. It is not
a fixed thing, and it is never these days limited to a single product.
134 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 132, at 325; United States v.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956) ; United States v. Columbia
Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 183-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
135 Stocking, The Rule of Reason, Workable Competition, and Monopoly, 64 Yale
L.J. 1108, 1110-11 (1955).
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... As early as 1958, more than 60 per cent of the manufacturing
companies in this country were in multi-product industries. So
you have an overlap of not only competition in the sale of a
particular product, but competition between materials, and also
competition between corporations, which, in effect, overlaps all of
these areas. From the business firms' viewpoint, they are com-
peting simultaneously on all these different planes. Too often the
antitrust case not only operates on a single plane, but also carves
that single plane up into very narrow slices . . . and they ignore
all the rest of the three dimensional market place in which the
corporation really lives. 1"
If the concept of the relevant market is to serve as a useful device for
identifying the competitive environment .of mergers, several factors besides
product substitutability must be considered. "[Market] definition requires
a balanced consideration of a number of characteristics or dimensions to
meet the analytical needs of the specific problem under consideration."'"
Lawyer-economist Mark Massel suggests looking into the following factors:
Among the important dimensions to be considered in the defini-
tion of a market are: physical characteristics, attractiveness to
buyers, cross-elasticity of demand, sellers' costs, relative prices,
end uses, stages of marketing, integration and stages of manu-
facture, methods of production or origin, . . . and actual and po-
tential competition.'"
Numerous other factors, such as similarity of marketing techniques, corn-
plementariness of products, market position in related fields, could be added
at random. The point is that all of these factors share one common aspect:
each represents a particular way of looking at a market.
"End uses of products," for example, looks at consumer needs; "cross-
elasticity of demand" at consumer response. "Method of production" con-
siders the market from the supply point of view; can the manufacturer
shift easily from the production of one product to production of another
related product? "Similarity of marketing techniques" relates to the com-
parative ease or difficulty with which a product can be adapted to the
marketing practices of a seller of related products.
Moreover, each of these factors often has an important bearing on
the operation of the others. Consider the relationship among the physical
characteristics, end uses, production flexibility, marketing techniques, and
market position in related product lines in a hypothetical merger of one
of the cigarette giants and a small independent cigar manufacturer. Cigarettes
and cigars have similar physical characteristics; they compete for the same
end use; in certain stages of production—the buying of raw materials,
processing, and manufacturing—the same employees, procedures, and equip-
186
 Panel Discussion sponsored by the American Bar Association Committee on the
Clayton Act in 24 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 113, 134 (April 1964).
187 Massel, Competition and Monopoly 248 (Anchor-Doubleday ed. 1964).
188 Id. at 249-50.
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ment might be adapted for use on both; both are marketed in the same
manner through the same distributors; and a strong position in the cigarette
market would greatly facilitate the sale and distribution of cigars. In light
of all this, there would be a good case for defining the relevant market not
only as cigarettes or cigars, but also as the combined cigarette and cigar
market, or even the tobacco industry. Yet the cross-elasticity of demand
between cigarettes and cigars is probably very low. One of them would
no doubt have to be independently priced out of the market before a
significant increase in demand for the other made itself felt.
It may also happen, however, that in a particular case one factor may
so overshadow all the others as to justify drawing the boundaries of the
relevant market solely with reference to it. For example, the slight adjust-
ment in labor, equipment, and materials that might be required to switch
from the manufacture of low-priced men's clothing to production of medium-
priced men's clothing would justify defining the relevant market as the
combined low- and medium-priced men's clothing market in a case in-
volving a merger between a firm that made one and a firm that made the
other.
There are, then, any number of factors which singly or in combina-
tion might provide the basis for delineating the relevant market. Congress
in amending Section 7 stated no preference for any one of them. It provided
only that a merger with the proscribed effect in "any line of commerce"
violated Section 7. It left to the courts, and, ultimately, to the Supreme
Court, the task of developing standards for market definition. To date,
there have been three important Supreme Court decisions on the relevant
market. These decisions, while they fall short of a definitive treatment of
the problem, reveal that the Supreme Court entertains a flexible and ex-
pansive notion of the relevant market, and that the market concept is
destined to play a' far more important and devastating part in Section 7
enforcement than even the most pessimistic corporation counsel might have
imagined.
Brown Shoe
-	 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 18° the first Supreme 'Court decision
under the amended Section 7, was a fairly easy line of commerce case. In
1955, the government filed a Section 7 civil complaint in the United States
District Court for Eastern Missouri, challenging the contemplated merger
between the Brown Shoe Company and the G. R. Kinney Company. 14°
Brown was the third largest seller of shoes by dollar volume in the United
States, the fourth largest manufacturer of men's, women's, and children's
shoes, and, a retailer that owned, operated, or controlled over 1230 retail
outlets. Kinney was the eighth largest company in dollar volume in shoe
sales,, the twelfth largest manufacturer of shoes, and a retailer with over
350 outlets. The government contended that the effect of the Brown-Kinney
139 Supra note 132.
140 The district court opinion is reported in 179 F. Sapp. 721 (.1959). The sum-
mary of facts is taken from the four opinions given in this case, including the district
court's, the' Supreme Court's, Justice Harlan's, and Justice Clark's.
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merger "may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly" by eliminating actual or potential competition on the national
wholesale shoe market and in the sale of shoes at retail throughout the
nation. It urged the district court to define the relevant product market
as either "footwear," generally, or as men's, women's, and children's shoes,
separately considered. Brown, on the other hand, argued that if the lines
of commerce were properly determined, the merger would be shown not
to endanger competition. It urged several narrower lines of commerce,
based not only on considerations of the age and sex of the intended cus-
tomers, but also on considerations of grades of materials, quality of work-
manship, price, and customer use of shoes.
The district court rejected the extreme contentions of both parties,
finding that "there is one group of classifications which is understood and
recognized by the entire industry and the public—the classification into
`men's,' `women's' and 'children's' shoes separately and independently." 14"
It then went on to hold that, in both its horizontal and vertical aspects,
Brown's acquisition of Kinney violated Section 7. 142
On appeal, the Supreme Court, drawing an apparently unnecessary
distinction, first declared that, in market definition, both the broad outer
market and its component submarkets must be considered: ". . . within
this broad market, well-defined submarkets may exist which, in themselves,
constitute product markets for antitrust purposes."'" The limits of the
outer market are to be drawn with reference to "the reasonable interchange-
ability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself
and substitutes for it." 144 In determining the submarkets, several "practical
indicia" are to be consulted, among them: "industry or public recognition
of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product's peculiar
characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers,
distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors."'"
Applying its submarket criteria, the Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's finding of three lines of commerce. In response to Brown's objection
that the medium-priced shoes it manufactured occupied a different product
market from the Iow-priced shoes sold by Kinney, the Court stated that
to hold that low- and medium-priced shoes constituted separate markets
would be to ignore the realities of the price competition between them.'"
In assessing the relevance of the price factor, the Court stated:
This is not to say, however, that "price/quality" differences,
where they exist, are unimportant in analyzing a merger; they may
be of importance in determining the likely effect of a merger. But
the boundaries of the relevant market must be drawn with sufficient
breadth to include the competing products of each of the merging
141 Supra note 140, at 732,
142
 Id. at 741.
143 Supra note 132, at 325.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Id. at 326.
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companies and to recognize competition where, in fact, competition
exists.' 47
In disposing of Brown's other objection that "age/sex" differences, espe-
cially with regard to children's shoes, required narrower lines of commerce,
the Court granted some factual validity to these differences, but denied
their legal relevance. "[W]e do not think in this case the District Court
was required to employ finer `age/sex' distinctions than those recognized
by its classification of `men's,' `women's,' and 'children's' shoes. Further divi-
sion does not aid us in analyzing the effects of this merger." 148 The Court
then held that the Brown-Kinney merger was likely substantially to lessen
competition in both its horizontal and vertical aspects.
The majority in Brown, using the submarket device, defined the
relevant market from the consumers' viewpoint. Justices Clark and Harlan,
concurring separately on the merits, looked at the market from the manu-
facturer's and seller's viewpoint. Justice Clark, emphasizing the marketing
aspect of the case, saw the line of commerce as
shoes of all types. This is emphasized by the nature of Brown's
manufacturing activity and its plan to integrate the Kinney stores
into its operations. . . Brown's business is on a national scale
and its policy of integration of manufacturing and retailing is on
that basis. . . . [I] t would be more reasonable to define the line
of commerce as shoes—those sold in the ordinary retail store, ... 148
Justice Harlan, looking to the production aspect, concluded that,
because of .. flexibility of manufacture, the product market with
respect to the merger between Brown's manufacturing facilities
and Kinney's retail outlets might more accurately be defined as
the complete wearing-apparel shoe market .. .. For if a manu-
facturer of women's shoes is able, albeit at some expense, to con-
vert his plant to the production of men's shoes, the possibility
of such a shift should be considered in deciding whether the
market for either men's shoes or women's shoes can be monop-
olized or whether a particular merger substantially lessens com-
petition among manufacturers of either product.' 5°
The three opinions in Brown perfectly illustrate both the various angles
from which the market may be viewed and how one factor may be of suffi-
cient importance to justify drawing the line of commerce on the strength
of it alone. However the market was regarded, anticompetitive effects were
seen to flow from the Brown-Kinney merger. In the majority's view, the
anticompetitive effects would be felt most by the consumer, whose freedom
of choice in buying shoes would be restricted. In the opinions of Justices
Clark and Harlan, Brown's rivals in the shoe industry would be the ones
to suffer.
147 Ibid.
148 Id. at 327.
140 Id. at 356.
150
 Id. at 367.
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The importance of Brown Shoe as line of commerce precedent stems
from the broad tack taken by the majority. As the concurring opinions
indicated, the submarket division was unnecessary to the decision. Why
then bother to make it?
The answer may be that the majority in deciding Brown regarded a
one level approach to market definition as unduly restricting market analysis.
Defining the relevant market only at that point or at those points where
the product lines of the merging firms happen to converge cannot but result
in a static representation of market activity. It is important to bear in
mind that Section 7 is a broad statute, aimed at what was felt to be a
broad evil—undue concentration in the economy, not in one product
line, or even in one industry. That the majority so regarded Section 7 is
evinced by its review of its legislative history, its emphasis on the statutory
purpose to arrest incipient monopolistic tendencies,' 51 and its insistence
on seeing the competitive realities of the shoe industry. Perhaps, the majority
felt that a combined wide and narrow-angle approach to market definition
was necessary if a realistic picture of a post-merger market situation was to
be obtained.
An examination of the rules laid down by the majority in Brown for
defining the outer market and submarkets tends to support the conclusion
that Brown stands for a multi-dimensional view of the relevant market.
The statement "the outer boundaries of a product market are determined
by the reasonable interchangeability of use or cross-elasticity of demand
between the product itself and the substitutes for it" makes economic non-
sense when literally applied to the outermarket in Brown—shoes in general.
There is no cross-elasticity of demand among men's, women's and children's
shoes. The statement may also, however, be taken to mean that the outer-
market is to be looked upon as the sum of related component prodtict lines,
determined by reference to product substitutability or to another or others
of the various elements that enter into market definition, such as production
flexibility or similarity of marketing techniques. If this interpretation is
correct, the majority in Brown, in drawing its market-submarket distinction,
fashioned a flexible and potent weapon for Section 7 enforcement. For,
when the concepts of the outermarket and the component submarkets are
combined, the result is a simple but supple device for locating and registering
concentration wherever it might appear in the economic aftermath of a merger.
Continental Can
While there was no telling at the time just what Brown Shoe signified,
any doubt that it stood for anything less than a total view of the relevant
market was thoroughly dispelled in the spring of 1964, which saw the
Supreme Court hand down a spate of Section 7 decisions, two of them
important for line of commerce. Both cases, United States v. Continental
Can Co.' 52
 and United States v. Alumintim Co. of America, 153 involved
151 The Court discusses both these points at great length at 311-23.
152 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
158 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
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reversals of district court judgments, and both evoked charges that the
Supreme Court was finding facts in violation of Rule 52(a) 1 " of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. More importantly, both cases establish
once and for all that the Supreme Court's approach to market definition is
multi-dimensional.
In 1956 the government initiated a Section 7 action challenging Con-
tinental Can Company's acquisition of all the assets of Hazel-Atlas Glass
Company.'" In 1955, the year prior to the merger, Continental, with assets
of $382 million, was the second largest manufacturer of metal containers.
It shipped 33% of all the metal containers sold in the United States, and
together with American Can Company, the industry leader, accounted for
71% of all the metal containers shipped in the United States. Continental
had enjoyed a steady history of expansion, accomplished chiefly through
mergers. Its assets after acquiring Hazel-Atlas and two other companies
in 1956 rose to more than $633 million; its net sales from $666 million in
1955 to more than $1 billion.
Hazel-Atlas, in 1955, had net sales in excess of $79 million and assets
of more than $37 million. Its share of shipments in the glass industry, ap-
proximately 9.6% of the glass container shipments in 1955, placed it third
in the industry. Together with Owens-Illinois Glass Company, the leader
with 34.2%, and Anchor Hocking, second with 11.6%, it accounted for 55.4%
of the total glass container shipments in 1955.
In the district court, both parties agreed that the can industry and the
glass container industry were lines of commerce. Beyond this, the govern-
ment urged several other lines of commerce, some of them defined in terms
of various end uses for which metal and glass containers compete. These
end use claims included containers for the beer industry, the soft drink
industry, the toiletry and cosmetic industries, the medicine and health
industries, and containers for the household and chemical industries. The
district court recognized that there was vigorous inter-industry competition
among glass, metal and plastic containers for various end uses.
[T]here was substantial and vigorous inter-industry competition
between these three industries and between various of the products
which they manufactured. Metal can, glass container and plastic
container manufacturers were each seeking to enlarge their sales
to the thousands of packers of hundreds of varieties of food,
chemical, toiletry and industrial products . . . .1"
But it refused to define the relevant market along the lines of the inter-
industry competition, holding that "the fact that there is inter-industry
or inter-product competition between metal, glass and plastic containers
is not determinative of the metes and bounds of a relevant product mar-
154
 Rule 52(a) provides in relevant part that: "Findings of fact shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous ...."
155 The summary of facts is taken from the district court and the Supreme Court
majority opinions. The district court opinion appears in 217 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y.
1963).
155 Supra note 155, at 780.
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ket." 157
 As the district court, quoting Brown, saw it, the outer boundaries
of the relevant market were to be determined according to the principle
of cross-elasticity of demand, and the cross-elasticity of demand among
glass, metal, and plastic containers was too low to constitute them a single
line of commerce.
Attempts by the Government here to combine these separate indus-
tries and their products or to combine separate and distinct prod-
ucts from separate and distinct industries into single product
markets necessarily failed because appropriate distinctions were
not made between inter-industry or overall commodity competition
and the type of competition between products with reasonable
interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity of demand which has
Clayton Act significance.' 58
The district court then held that the merger was a conglomerate and that
the government had failed to sustain its burden of proving that the merger,
as a conglomerate, was likely substantially to lessen competition.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the district
court erred in defining the relevant market. In giving the Court's reason
for taking the case, Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority, stated: "We
noted probable jurisdiction to consider the specialized problems incident
to the application of § 7 to inter-industry mergers and acquisitions." 1"
At this point, it is important to note what the Court understood by "in-
dustry" and "inter-industry."
Both parties and the district court refer to this as an inter-
industry merger. The word "industry" is susceptible of more than
one meaning. It might be defined in terms of end uses for which
various products compete; so defined it would be roughly equivalent
to the concept of a "line of commerce." According to this interpre-
tation the glass and metal container businesses, to the extent they
compete, are in the same industry. On the other hand, "industry"
might also denote an aggregate of enterprises employing similar
production and marketing facilities and producing products having
markedly similar characteristics. In many instances, the segments
of economic endeavor embraced by these two concepts of "in-
dustry" will be substantially coextensive, since those who employ
the same types of machinery to turn out the same general product
often compete in the same market. Since this is not suth a case,
it will be helpful to use the word "industry" as referring to
similarity of production facilities and products. So viewed, "in-
terindustry competition" becomes a meaningful concept. (Em-
phasis supplied. ) 1"
It is worth comparing these two descriptive definitions of industry. The
157 Id. at 781.
158 Id. at 781-82.
159 Supra note 152, at 444.
169 Id. at 444 n.2.
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first definition, "in terms of end uses for which various products compete,"
looks at "industry" from the standpoint of consumer wants and needs.
The second definition considers the production and marketing aspects of
"industry." The problem confronting the Court was largely semantic and
logical. The merger of Continental and Hazel-Atlas, and the competi-
tion between cans and bottles, was concededly inter-industrial. To treat
the glass and metal container industries as separate industries from the
end use standpoint, according to which an industry is "roughly equivalent
to a line of commerce," would be to admit that they occupy different lines
of commerce or product markets and there would be nothing on which to
predicate a Section 7 violation, If, however, the glass and can businesses
were regarded as separate industries solely from the production and mar-
keting standpoint, nothing would prevent the Court from holding that
the end use competition among cans and bottles was strong enough to
place them in the same product market. In effect, the Court held that the
glass and metal container industries constituted a significant submarket of
one end use industry, the container industry; it excluded the end use concept
of industry from its inquiry, regarded the metal and glass container in-
dustries from the production and marketing standpoint, analyzed the inter-
industry end use competition, and, finally, reverted to its end use definition
of industry in holding that bottles and cans constituted a single line of
commerce.
The majority's handling of the concepts of "industry" and "interin-
dustry competition" is a good illustration of its broad competitive realities
approach to market definition. The important element of market definition
in Continental Can was end use competition. There is no reason to doubt,
however, that in a proper case, such as where the products of the merging
companies are not directly competitive, a broad line of commerce would
be drawn on the strength of other market elements. In its second definition
of "industry," the Court spoke of "an aggregate of enterprises employing
similar production and marketing facilities and producing products having
markedly similar characteristics." (Emphasis supplied.) Consider the Procter
& Gamble case.101 Procter manufactured and sold a broad line of house-
hold cleansing agents, toiletries, food and other supermarket products, none
of them directly competitive with Clorox's lone product, household liquid
bleach. Viewed from the end use competition standpoint, all of these products
occupy separate lines of commerce and separate industries. Considered from
other standpoints, however, various lines of commerce are seen to emerge.
Procter leads the nation in the production of household soaps and detergents.
These products and liquid bleach, while not directly competitive, share
many common features. They are closely related in use; all are low-cost,
high-turnover supermarket items; all are sold to the same customers through
the same distribution channels. Might not household soaps, detergents, and
liquid bleach be classified as products of the same "aggregate of enterprises
employing similar production and marketing facilities?" In other words,
let The Procter & Gamble Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (Trade Reg. Rep. Tr. Binder,
F.T.C. Complaints, Orders, Stipulations) a 16673 (Nov. 26, 1963), appeal docketed, No.
15769, 6th. Cir., Feb. 13, 1964.
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from the marketing and production standpoints, especially the former, the
household soap and detergent business and the liquid bleach business are
in the same industry. And, since Procter and Clorox each enjoys a strong
position in its respective field, the chances are that the combined soap-
detergent and liquid bleach businesses will be held a market or significant
submarket for Section 7 purposes.' 62
A close examination of the process by which the Court delineated the
relevant market in Continental Can and the reasons it gave for this deline-
ation demonstrates even more forcefully the breadth of its notion of the
relevant market.
The Court stated the central issue of the case to be "whether the ad-
mitted competition between metal and glass containers for uses other than
packaging beer was of the type and quality deserving of § 7 protection
and therefore the basis for defining a relevant product market."'" This
statement of the issue gives the tenor of the Court's approach to market
definition. Section 7's broad legislative design, to nip increases in economic
concentration in the bud, is placed in the forefront of market analysis. The
degree of concentration in the container industry in general and in the
bottle and can industries, instead of relating solely to the issue of lessening
of competition, now appears to bear directly on the issue of the relevant
market. Whether the inter-industry competition in Continental Can had
Clayton Act significance depended to some extent on the amount of con-
centration in the container industry, and the container industry, as the
Court saw it, was highly concentrated.
After stating the issue, the Court declared that the proper approach to
market definition is neither unduly narrow nor unduly broad. Instead, it
reiterated, "in defining the product market between these terminal extremes,
we must recognize meaningful competition where it is found to exist."'"
Having thus charted its course, the Court proceeded to analyze the inter-
industry competition between cans and bottles. It conceded that there were
many significant differences between metal and glass containers "which may
162 Commissioner Elman, in classifying Procter's acquisition of Clorox as a product
extension horizontal, suggested this result. One of the lines of commerce drawn by Elman
was household cleansing agents. In 1957, Procter, with net sales of $514 million, Colgate-
Palmolive, with $291 million, and Lever Brothers, with $250 million, accounted for 80%
of the total net sales in the household cleansing agent line. Purex was fourth, with about
$50 million, and B. T. Babbitt, Inc., fifth, with less than $22 million. Elman did not
include household liquid bleach in the household cleansing agents line, confining it to
soaps, detergents, and cleansers. If, however, this line were extended to include liquid
bleach, Clorox's 1957 net sales of almost $40 million would place it fifth. It should also
be noted that Purex, the fourth largest company in the household cleansing agents line,
was also second to Clorox in the liquid bleach industry. Id. at 21562-66. The close relation-
ship between household cleansing agents and household liquid bleach and the respective
positions of Procter, Purex, and Clorox in these lines were seen to enhance the likelihood
of anticompetitive effects in the liquid bleach industry, inasmuch as Purex, which "now
competes with Procter in the liquid bleach as well as in the packaged detergents industry,
. • • may be inclined to act cautiously in the liquid bleach market for fear of provoking
Procter's retaliation along the whole front of Purex's activities." Id. at 21585. See also
text accompanying notes 12 and 13, supra.
168 Supra note 152, at 449.
104 Ibid.
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disqualify one or the other, at least in their present form, from this or that
particular use . . ." and that "the competition between metal and glass
containers is different from the competition between the can companies
themselves or between the products of the different glass companies." Never-
theless, in the Court's mind, these considerations were not "sufficient to
obscure the competitive relationships which this record so compellingly
reveals."'"
The record revealed an intense and pervasive battle between cans and
bottles ranging from a vast general campaign to small local skirmishes. In
several areas, the competition was particularly intense. In the baby food
business, long a glass stronghold, cans were beginning to pose a serious
challenge. Cans were also making inroads in the soft drink business, another
field long dominated by glass. In the beer industry, ". . . an intense com-
petitive battle on behalf of the beer can and the beer bottle is being waged
both by the industry trade associations and by individual container manu-
facturers, one of the principal protagonists being Continental."'" The
can-glass rivalry was also intense in the food industry, where "one type of
container has supplanted the other in the packing of some products and .. .
in some instances similar products are packaged in two or more different
types of containers."'" In other industries, c". .. glass container, plastic
container and metal container manufacturers are each seeking to promote
their lines of containers at the expense of other lines, . . . all are attempting
to improve their products or to develop new ones so as to have a wider
customer appeal,'* . . . the result being that 'manufacturers from time to
time may shift a product from one type of container to another.' f" 188
In light of the real and intensive competition between metal and glass
containers disclosed by the record the Court concluded that the
. . . District Court employed an unduly narrow construction of
the "competition" protected by § 7 and of "reasonable interchange-
ability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand" in judging the
facts of this case. . . . These terms as used in the statute or in
Brown Shoe were [not] intended to limit the competition protected
by § 7 to competition between identical products. . . . Certainly,
that the competition here involved may be called "inter-industry
competition" and is between products with distinctive charac-
teristics does not automatically remove it from the reach of § 7. 1"
It can be readily seen from the above excerpts from the majority
opinion in Continenal Can that the Supreme Court is not concerned with
the niceties of economics in defining the relevant market. The concept of
cross-elasticity of demand, as a means of gauging the intensity of commodity
competition, is doomed to play a minor role in future Section 7 cases. The
186 Id. at 450.
166 Id. at 451-52.
167 Id. at 452.
168
 Id. at 452, quoting the district court opinion, supra note 155, at 804(*) and
805(t).
169 Id. at 452-53.
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emphasis now is on the broad economic realities, on whether or not the
framers of Section 7 would have intended protection for an area of com-
petition affected by a merger, in short whether the policy of Section 7 calls
for such and such a market definition.
The Court concluded its discussion of the line of commerce issue by
addressing itself to Continental's two objections to its combining metal and
glass containers in the same product market: (1) that the record did not
disclose the actual and complete extent of the competition between cans
and bottles, and (2) that proper delineation of the relevant market would
have to "include plastic, paper, foil and any other materials competing for
the same business.' 170
 In response to the first objection the Court stated:
The claimed deficiencies in the record cannot sweep aside the exist-
ence of a large area of effective competition between the makers
of cans and the makers of glass containers. We know enough to
conclude that the rivalry between cans and glass containers is per-
vasive and that the area of competitive overlap between these two
product markets is broad enough to make the position of the
individual companies within their own industries very relevant to
the merger's impact within the broader competitive area that em-
braces both of the merging firms' respective industries. . .. Since
the purpose of delineating a line of commerce is to provide an ade-
quate basis for measuring the effects of a given acquisition, its
contours must, as nearly as possible, conform to competitive reality.
Where the area of effective competition cuts across industry lines,
so must the relevant line of commerce; otherwise an adequate
determination of the merger's true impact cannot be made. 171
As to the second objection, the Court simply observed that the existence
of a "broader product market made up of metal, glass and other competing
containers does not necessarily negative the existence of submarkets of
cans, glass, plastic or cans and glass together . . . ." 172
The Court's disposition of these objections emphatically reiterates its
approach to market definition: in all merger cases, the line of commerce must
be drawn so as to give maximum effect to Section 7's ban on incipient
monopolistic tendencies; this can be achieved only by looking to the broad
competitive realities; insofar as economic principles do not square with
Section 7's underlying philosophy and the facts of American business life,
they must yield. That is the theme of Continental Can, running in an un-
broken thread from beginning to end, from the definitions of "industry"
through the statement of the issue to the discussion of the facts, conclusion,
and rebuttal.
After defining the relevant market, the Court applied the market share
test developed in Brown Shoe and Philadelphia Bank"3
 and held that the
merger violated Section 7. In 1955, the year before the merger, six corn-
170 Id. at 457.
171
 Id. at 456-57.
172 Id. at 457-58.
173 See text accompanying note 197, infra.
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panies, accounting for 70.1% of all the containers shipped in the United
States, dominated the combined metal and glass container industries, which
at the time of the merger had annual sales of almost $3 billion. Continental's
21.9% share of the total container shipments placed it second in the con-
tainer market; Hazel-Atlas, with a 3.1% market share, ranked sixth. Con-
tinental's acquisition of Hazel-Atlas, by increasing its market share by
more than 14% to 25%, not only further entrenched its dominant position
in the container market, but also reduced the number of its "most significant
competitors" from five to four. In the Court's mind, when Hazel-Atlas's
3.1% market share was added to Continental's 21.9%, the result approached
.. . that held presumptively bad in United States v. Philadelphia
National Bank .... The case falls squarely within the principle
that where there has been a "history of tendency toward concen-
tration in the industry" tendencies toward further concentration
"are to be curbed in their incipiency"* . . . [and the principle
that] where "concentration is already great, the importance of
preventing even slight increases in concentration and so preserving
the possibility of eventual deconcentration is correspondingly
great." ]•i74
Mr. Justice Harlan, in a caustic dissent, bitterly assailed the majority's
definition of the relevant market, labelling it a "travesty of economics,"'"
a "mock-statistical analysis."'" The source of Mr. Justice Harlan's displea-
sure is not difficult to find. It stems from a notion of the role of the market
concept and of the whole problem of Section 7 enforcement diametrically
at odds with that of the Court.
Mr. Justice Harlan would have defined the relevant market as the sepa-
rate glass and metal container industries by a strict application of the concept
of cross-elasticity of demand and the other criteria established in Brown
Shoe.' 77 He would then have inquired into the "impact of the merger in
the two lines of commerce here involved . . . . 3'178 Absent a showing of actual
or probable anticompetitive effect in these lines of commerce, he would
hold no Section 7 violation. In short, he would affirm the district court
judgment.'" The majority, on the other hand, Mr. Justice Harlan insisted,
was "in effect, laying down a 'per se' rule that mergers between two large com-
panies in related industries are presumptively unlawful" 18° under color of a
174 Supra note 152, at 461-62, quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note
132, at 345, 346(*), and United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 365 n.42
(1963)(t).
175 Id. at 472.
170 Id. at 475.
777 Id. at 470-75.
178 Id. at 475.
179 The district court had held that the Government had failed to sustain its
burden of proving the "reasonable probability of substantial anti-competitive effects."
Instead, "its case was based on what it claimed to be anti-competitive effects which
might occur in the future. • . . It is a far cry from might occur to a reasonable prob-
ability of occurring." (Emphasis in original.) Supra note 155, at 783-84.
180 Supra note 152, at 476.
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specious application of the "shortcut 'market share' approach." 18' In its una-
dulterated form, Mr. Justice Harlan maintained, the per se approach "frankly
disavows attention to a 'line of commerce.' "152 Instead, it posits a test of
showing that a merger may substantially lessen competition " 'by proving (a)
the existence of substantial competition between two industries; (b) a high
degree of concentration in either or both of the competing industries; and
(c) the dominant positions of each of the merging companies in its respec-
tive industry.' " 183 In essence, the per se rule Mr. Justice Harlan describes is
a variation on a theme by Commissioner Elman, 184 attuned to the fact situa-
tion in Continental Can, and, as Mr. Justice Harlan notes, ". . there is some
suggestion in the last few pages of the Court's opinion that the Court appre-
ciates this."185
Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent points up the critical role played by line of
commerce in the Court's approach to Section 7 enforcement. By adopting
a flexible, all-encompassing notion of the relevant market, the Court has
been able to adapt its two-step, line of commerce-market share approach
to a merger that many, especially among the antitrust bar, thought a
conglomerate.' 86 It is a hard approach, perhaps it amounts to a per se ap-
proach. Whether it is a valid approach is sure to become a matter of heated
controversy, with the two opinions in Continental Can providing the battle
cries for the opposing camps.
Discussion of the validity of the Court's delineation of the relevant
market will undoubtedly follow the lines of the broader debate. Proponents
of a "rule of reason" will denounce it as a travesty on economics. Those
favoring rigorous enforcement of Section 7 will insist that the Court is
merely observing competitive realities.
Given the broad purpose of the statute, the balance probably hangs
in favor of the Court. For, while its handling of the line of commerce issue
does not square with a strict application of the principle of cross-elasticity
of demand or any other economic principle, the most cursory glance at the
market relationships between metal and glass containers supports the
validity of the Court's competitive realities approach. Cans and glass con-
tainers do compete for the same end uses. The price of one and its at-
tractiveness to the ultimate consumer bear directly on the demand for the
other. While they differ in methods of production and origin, so that there
is little opportunity to integrate their manufacture, both may be adapted
to the same marketing and distribution facilities, since both are aimed at
the same customers. Further, the market positions of Continental and
Hazel-Atlas in their respective markets make it easier for both to sell
their products. In sum, virtually all of the factors the businessman looks
151 Id. at 475.
152 Id. at 470-71 n.6.
185 Id. at 470 n.6, quoting Government's brief, p. 22.
154 See discussion of the Procter & Gamble case, supra p. 263, and the Consolidated
Foods Case, supra p. 274.
155 Supra note 152, at 470-71 n.6.
155 See, for example, Panel Discussion, New Frontiers in Section 7 Enforcement,
sponsored by the Committee on the Clayton Act of the Antitrust Section of the
American Bar Association, August 11, 1963.
293
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
to in assessing the power of a competitor speak in favor of a combined
metal and glass container market.
Alcoa
The other important line of commerce case decided by the Supreme
Court Iast spring, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,187 accentuates
the rigor of the Court's competitive realities approach to market definition.
The Government initiated the Alcoa case in 1960 by filing a complaint
in the Northern District Court of New York, charging that Alcoa's 1959
acquisition of the stock and assets of Rome Cable Corporation violated
Section 7. The district court, after a full trial, dismissed the complaint. 188
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the acquisition resulted in a
probable lessening of competition in the market for aluminum conductor,
and ordered divestiture.
The manner of the Supreme Court's reversal is practically impossible
to reconcile with the district court's fact findings. The latter, after care-
fully applying all the "practical indicia" set out in Brown Shoe, rejected
the Government's critical line of commerce claims. The Supreme Court,
ostensibly on the same facts relied on by the district court, upheld these
claims.
The facts of the Alcoa case are extremely involved, and it adds little
to an understanding of the importance of the case as line of commerce
precedent to review them in great detail. As precedent, the case is important
for two reasons. First, and above all, it manifests the determination of
the Supreme Court to give full and effective meaning to Section 7's legislative
purpose. Secondly, it vividly demonstrates the potential usefulness of the
submarket concept as a device for detecting undue concentration within
an industry.
The Government lost its case in the district court on the line of com-
merce issue. It contended that the Alcoa-Rome merger would probably
substantially lessen competition in the market for aluminum conductor in
general. Basically, there are two types of aluminum conductor, bare alumi-
num conductor and insulated aluminum conductor. The parties stipulated
that bare aluminum conductor was a line of commerce. To establish alumi-
num conductor in general as a line of commerce, the government had first
to prove that insulated aluminum conductor was a line of commerce, and
then that the combination of bare and insulated aluminum conductor into
a broad aluminum conductor line of commerce was proper. The district
court, applying the Brown Shoe submarket criteria, held that insulated
aluminum conductor did not qualify as a line of commerce distinct from
the broader insulated conductor line, made up of insulated aluminum and
insulated copper conductor. Insulated aluminum conductor was not "recog-
nized in the industry as a separate economic entity"; it was not " 'generally
non-competitive' witb•copper"; both insulated aluminum conductor and in-
sulated copper conductor could be made on the same machinery; both were
187 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
188
 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 214 F. Supp. 501 (N.D.N.Y. 1963).
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functionally interchangeable; the purchase and use of both were "prin-
cipally dictated by economic factors." Although copper and aluminum
conductor had some different characteristics and preferred uses and ". .
aluminum wire and cable is sold at prices generally distinct from copper
and does not have the same price sensitivity . . ." the practical indicia
established in Brown Shoe required the conclusion that insulated aluminum
conductor and insulated copper conductor occupied the same, indivisible
product market.'" Accordingly, insulated aluminum conductor could not
be separated from insulated copper conductor and combined with bare
aluminum conductor into a broad aluminum conductor line of commerce.'"
On appeal, the Supreme Court, in express contradiction of the district
court's fact findings, declared both insulated aluminum and aluminum
conductor in general lines of commerce. In holding insulated aluminum
conductor a line of commerce, it singled out as the deciding factors the
great price disparity between insulated aluminum and insulated copper con-
ductors, the preference for insulated aluminum for overhead distribution,
and the inability of fabricators of insulated copper conductor to overcome
aluminum's price advantage191—in spite of the district court's findings that
price was only one of several economic factors in the customer's decision
to buy insulated aluminum or insulated copper and that fabricators of in-
sulated conductor enjoyed complete production flexibility between copper
and aluminum. The Court rested its conclusion that bare and insulated
aluminum conductor should be combined into one Iine of commerce on
much the same grounds: the fact that both were sold to the same customers,
electrical utilities, for the same general use, conducting electricity; and the
fact that aluminum, because of its great price advantage over copper, was
the preferred overhead conductor, and copper, because of its smaller size
and superior ductility, the preferred underground and indoor conductor." 2
The most plausible explanation for the way the Court chose to reverse
the district court decision in Alcoa is that the majority of the Court was
189
 Id. at 509. As to price, the district court found that the price of the con-
ductor was only one of the factors in the electrical utilities companies' decision to buy
aluminum or copper. "The decision requires evaluation of numerous economic factors
in addition to the cost of the wire or cable itself." In some instances, such factors
as the added cost of connectors used with aluminum conductor made its final installed
price competitive with copper. Dissent of Mr. Justice Stewart, supra note 187, at 285-86,
quoting record, p. 1289. (Emphasis supplied by Mr. Justice Stewart.)
190 Ibid. In the district court's view, a broad aluminum conductor line, made up
of bare aluminum conductor and insulated aluminum conductor, would fail to depict
the relevant market accurately, since it would not include insulated copper conductor,
a substitute for insulated aluminum conductor. The Government had to establish the
broad aluminum conductor line, because it could not show a substantial lessening of
competition in any of the other conductor lines. While Alcoa's share of the bare alumi-
num conductor market was a high 32,5%, Rome's 0.3% constituted a de minimis
addition. In the insulated aluminum conductor line, the combination of Alcoa's 11.6%
market share and Rome's 4.7% was well below anything previously held bad under
Section 7. The addition of Rome's 1.3% market share to Alcoa's 27.8% in the broad
aluminum conductor line, however, was sufficient to invalidate the merger under the
rule laid down in the Philadelphia Bank case. See text accompanying note 197, infra.
191 Supra note 187, at 275-76.
192 Id. at 276-77.
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convinced that Alcoa's acquisition of Rome violated Section 7 and that
had the case been properly tried below, the district court would have
reached this result. The chief 'lesson of the case, then, would appear to be
that, if the Court is satisfied that Congress would have intended that a
particular merger be proscribed, the Court will not frustrate this intent,
no matter how badly mishandled or poorly tried the case may have been
below.
The reason for the decision in Alcoa becomes apparent on consideration
of the use the majority made of the submarket device after drawing the
lines of commerce. The picture the Court paints of the anticompetitive effects
in the aluminum conductor industry of the Alcoa-Rome merger is convincing.
Giant Alcoa leads in the production of primary aluminum, with 38.6% of
the primary aluminum capacity in the United States. It also leads in the
production of aluminum conductor, with a 27.8% market share. Its overall
dominance is repeated in the aluminum conductor subinarkets: Alcoa's
32.5% market share places it first in the production of bare aluminum
conductor; it ranks third in the production of insulated aluminum conductor,
with an 11.6% market share. Moreover, all of these markets and sub-
markets are highly concentrated. Alcoa, Reynolds, and Kaiser account for
88% of the primary aluminum capacity. Alcoa and Kaiser control 50% of
the aluminum conductor market, and with two other companies, 76%; only
nine companies, including Rome, with 1.3%, control 95.7% of this line.
In the insulated aluminum conductor submarket, five companies produced
65.4% of the total output, and nine firms, Rome among them, 88.2%.
What these lines of commerce revealed was "highly concentrated markets,
dominated by a few companies but served also by a small, though dimin-
ishing, group of independents."'" Rome was one of these independents;
indeed, in the eyes of the Court, it was "the prototype of the small inde-
7."194
 While its share ofpendent that Congress aimed to preserve by §
the aluminum conductor market, 1.3%, was comparatively small, Rome
was an important facfor in the aluminum conductor industry. It ranked
ninth overall in the aluminum conductor market, fourth among inde-
pendents; in the insulated aluminum conductor market it ranked eighth
overall, and fourth among independents. Moreover, Alcoa's absorption of
Rome was only part of a pattern that saw the giant, integrated aluminum
producers swallowing up small independent fabricators of insulated con-
ductor, with the result that "there now remain only four nonintegrated
fabricators of aluminum conductor whose individual shares of total industry
production . . . amounted to more than VA." 1a" In this context, the Court
held that Alcoa's acquisition of Rome violated Section 7. The aluminum
industry was already oligopolistic; the presence of a small group of dynamic
independents operated as the only check on the exercise of oligopoly power
by the aluminum giants in the aluminum conductor market. The "preserva-
198 Id. at 278-79.
194 Id. at 281.
195 Id. at 279 n.6.
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tion of Rome, rather than its absorption by one of the giants,"1 " would
help maintain this restraint intact.
Continental Can stands for the proposition that proper market defini-
tion, for Section 7 purposes, requires an all-encompassing view of the
industry or industries that a given merger is likely to affect. Little heed will
be paid to highly technical economic concepts and few attempts made to
apply them. Instead, the courts will view the market as the businessman
assesses it, with an eye to the overall competitive consequences of a merger.
And, in this broad context, the courts will realistically appraise the various
business relationships—both existing and potential—between merging com-
panies. This approach to market definition makes it more than likely
that the same factors that convince a large corporation to diversify its
product line by means of a merger will, in most cases, serve as the basis
for defining a relevant market.
When the market-submarket division, as employed in Alcoa, is added
to the expansive approach to market definition announced in Continental
Can, the potential of the relevant market concept as an implement for
strict Section 7 enforcement is exhausted.
The use of so broad a concept of "line of commerce" establishes a
"hard line" toward mergers because it paves the way for using the market
share test in a great number. of cases.
The market share test, as expounded in Philadelphia Bank, makes no
pretensions; it simply measures the size of the company resulting from the
merger and the degree of concentration in the relevant market. The test
operates quite simply, lends itself to easy application, and obviates the
need for detailed analysis of market structure, market behavior, and the
probable anti-competitive effect of a merger.
[A] merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage
share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase
in the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely
to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the
absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely
to have such anticompetitive effects.'"
When combined with principles such as "tendencies toward concentra-
tion in industry are to be curbed in their incipiency" 198 and . . . "if con-
centration is already great, the importance of preventing even slight increases
in concentration and so preserving the possibility of eventual deconcentra-
tion is correspondingly great,"°° the test is a very strict standard.
CONCLUSION
Continental Can and Alcoa show that business and the Court disagree
over what constitutes a conglomerate merger or diversification move. Both
cases were widely thought by business and the bar to involve conglomerate
196 Id. at 281.
197 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
199 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 346 (1962).
199 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, supra note 197, at 365 n.42.
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mergers and were expected to establish some standards for testing con-
glomerate mergers 2 00 But the Court's treatment of the "line of commerce"
issue in these two cases enabled it to dispose of them by applying the market
share test used to determine the legality of horizontal mergers.
In light of these decisions, one wonders about the fate of the standards
adopted by the FTC. The FTC has ventured boldly into economic theory
in an attempt to develop standards for assessing the probable lessening of
competition resulting from a conglomerate merger. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, taking a different tack in approaching Section 7, has concentrated
on developing a fluid "line of commerce" concept, while clinging to the
market share test. Is the only word from the Court, then, that some, per-
haps most, "conglomerate" mergers are not conglomerate?
After applying the market share test in Continental Can, the Court
proceeded to answer some of Continental's arguments. This rebuttal indi-
cates that when forced to deal with a merger as conglomerate the Court
will adopt standards similar to those developed by the FTC.
There was a probability that the Continental-Hazel-Atlas merger would
foreclose actual and potential competition between the two firms in the field
of containers for non-food purposes, produced by both companies 201 As
for the lack of current competition between the firms for some important
container end uses, "Continental might have concluded that it could effec-
tively insulate itself from competition by acquiring a major firm not
presently directing its market acquisition efforts toward the same end uses
as Continental, but possessing the potential to do so."2" And as an inde-
pendent firm Hazel-Atlas might have expanded its soft drink and baby
food container lines, but its acquisition by Continental, a firm vigorously
attempting to divert business in these lines to metal containers, could not but
"diminish the likelihood of Hazel-Atlas realizing its potential as a signifi-
cant competitor in either line."203
 Thus, the lack of current competition
between the two firms for some end uses was felt to "actually enhance the
long-run tendency of the merger to lessen competition." 204
 Note in these
statements the use of the concepts of potential competition developed in
El Paso and Penn-Olin 206
 But more importantly, note the striking similarity
between the Court's obvious belief that this merger would eliminate any
possibility of the two firms meeting competitively in the course of the
probable extension of their product lines and EIman's use of potential com-
petition in the Procter & Gamble and Ecko Products Co. cases 206
On another point, in answer to the argument of Continental that the
merger was an acceptable effort to gain competitive advantages by diver-
sifying its product lines, thereby strengthening competition which the anti-
200 See, Panel Discussion, New Frontiers in Section 7 Enforcement, supra note 186,
at 26.
201 United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 463 (1964).
202 Id. at 464.
203 Id. at 465.
204 Ibid.
205 See text accompanying notes 115, 118 and 127 supra.
208 See text accompanying notes 56 and 91 supra.
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trust laws are designed to promote, the Court stated: "But we think the
answer is otherwise when a dominant firm in a line of commerce in which
market power is already concentrated among a few firms makes an acquisi-
tion which enhances its market power and the vigor and effectiveness of
its own competitive efforts."2" This statement echoes the idea, appearing
throughout Elman's opinions in conglomerate merger cases, that the large
diversified corporation, possessing strong market power and significant ad-
vantages over small competitors, is a prime example of what Congress
intended to prevent by enacting Section 7. And, in Elman's view, to allow
such companies to consummate mergers that enhance their power, add other
markets to their conquests, and increase their size would be to betray the
underlying purpose of the Act.2"
Another interesting point of similarity between Elman's views and those
of the Supreme Court appears in Continental Can. According to the Court,
the district court erred in relying heavily on Continental's management of
Hazel-Atlas after the merger "while Continental was under some pressure
because of the pending government antitrust suit." 2" The crucial point
to the Court was that as a result of the merger Continental acquired the
"power to guide the development of Hazel-Atlas consistently with Conti-
nental's interest in metal containers."2 i0
Also, the merger of Continental and Hazel-Atlas would tend "to en-
danger a much broader anticompetitive effect by triggering other mergers
by companies seeking the same competitive advantages sought by Conti-
nental in this case."211 Commissioner Elman used the same argument in
the Procter & Gamble case.212
Finally, in the Court's view, the possibility that customers might
switch containers was a "deterrent against attempts by the dominant mem-
bers of either industry to reap the possible benefits of their position by
raising prices above the competitive level or engaging in other comparable
practices."213
 This sentiment is reminiscent of Elman's analysis of entry
barriers in its concern over the preservation of restraints on the market
power of large firms. 214
Continental Can is not the only grounds for believing that the standards
formulated by Elman for applying Section 7 to conglomerate mergers will
be adopted by the Supreme Court if it is forced to deal with a merger as
a conglomerate. As the cases discussed in this comment clearly show, the
Court and the FTC agree on the major policy questions involved in in-
207 Supra note 201, at 464.	 ID
233 Supra note 161, at 21585.
200
 Supra note 201, at 463. "It is possible .
	 . that the pendency of the instant
proceeding has had a deterrent effect upon expansionist activities by Procter in the
liquid bleach industry." The Procter & Gamble Co., supra note 161, at 21587 (discussing
post-acquisition evidence).
210 Supra note 201, at 463. Compare Commissioner Elman's discussion of evidence
of market behavior, note 33 supra and accompanying text.
211 Supra note 201, at 464.
212 Note 52 supra and accompanying text.
213 Supra note 201, at 465-66.
214 Note 22 supra and accompanying text.
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terpreting Section 7. Both believe that the primary purpose of Section 7
is to prevent undue concentration in the American economy; both have
adopted the premise that oligopoly offends the concept of competition em-
bodied in Section 7; both recognize—and intend to foster—the social and
political values that Congress intended to promote by preserving oppor-
tunities for small independent businesses. The Court and the FTC are well
aware that Section 7 speaks in terms of probability, not certainty; both are
attempting to assess the long range effects of mergers; both recognize the
diversified character of the American economy, and, as a result, both are
evaluating the effect of mergers in a broad context with a view to their
full implications for competition. Both place great value on potential com-
petition as a deterrent to misuse of market power by large firms and are
scrutinizing mergers closely to determine their impact on potential competi-
tion. Administratively, both are attempting to formulate clear, simple stand-
ards; both are concerned with the effect of mergers on market structure
rather than market behavior; both place little reliance on post-acquisition
evidence; and both intend to give Section 7 full scope and effect.
Consolidated Foods Corp., 215 the Court's first opportunity to pass
on the Federal Trade Commission's work interpreting Section 7, should
shed light on the fate of the Commission's standards. In Consolidated Foods,
one of the FTC's major efforts to interpret Section 7, Elman's detailed
analysis of the structure of the market, the power placed in Consolidated's
hands by the merger, and the potential injury to competition if that power
were used was dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on the basis of post-
acquisition evidence, as "speculation" and "conjecture." 216 The court of
appeals decision knocks the foundation out from under the standards the
FTC has been developing. Allowing post-acquisition evidence to contra-
dict evidence of market structure and the inferences drawn therefrom
seriously impairs the attempt of the FTC to limit the scope of Section 7
proceedings and to formulate clear, workable standards. Thus, this case
squarely presents the issue of what relative weight should be given to post-
acquisition evidence of market behavior, as opposed to evidence of market
structure.
Moreover, it will be interesting to see whether the Court handles this
merger as a conglomerate,217 as did the FTC and Court of Appeals, or uses
216
 Trade Reg. Rep. Tr. Binder, 1961-1963 F.T.C. Complaints, Orders, Stipula-
tions 16182 (Nov. 15, 1962), order set aside, 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. granted,
34U.S.L. Week 3066 (U.S. August 21, 1964) (No. 422).
216
 329 F.2d 623,627.
217 If treated as a conglomerate merger, the case would have far reaching con-
sequences. Reciprocity is a widespread business practice among large corporations,
and the rationale of Elman's opinion has been said to establish a per se rule. Handier,
Emerging Antitrust Issues: Reciprocity, Diversification, and Joint Ventures, 49 U. Va.
L. Rev. 433, 433-40 (1963). See supra note 111 and accompanying text. It is worth
noting that one of the criteria suggested by the Court in Penn-Olin for determining
the probability of a substantial lessening of competition was "the adaptability of [Penn-
Olin's] . . . line of commerce to non-competitive practices," 378 U.S. 158, 177, because
the reciprocity theory of Consolidated Foods had been argued by the Justice Depart-
ment in the district court.
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the "line of commerce" concepts developed in Continental Can to convert
the merger into a horizonta1.218
Throughout the history of [the antitrust statutes] . . . it has been
constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate
and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an
organization of industry in small units which can effectively com-
pete with each other.219
Both the FTC and the Supreme Court are wholeheartedly implementing
this underlying purpose of Section 7. To business, then, speculation on the
difference between their approaches to Section 7 must seem academic, for
the Supreme Court and the FTC send the same message: if a merger is
a sound business move by a large, successful corporation, it probably
violates Section 7.
THOMAS J. CAREY, JR.
JEROME K. FROST
218 See supra note 96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lines of
commerce involved.
219
 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945)
(per Judge Learned Hand).
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